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Initial public offering of private equity backed entities has been a remarkably popular topic 
among financial scholars. The allure of growth potential and sophisticated corporate structures 
has gain private equity backed entities a special place in initial public offering theory. 
Underpricing and underperformance have been central topics on this research. Financial literature 
has proposed information asymmetries as the central theory explaining these phenomena. 
Empirical evidence has shown certification as a mechanism to ameliorate information asymmetry. 
Further research has confirmed the certification power of private equity sponsors by reducing the 
underpricing and underperformance of sponsored entities. However, there is evidence that 
suggests different levels of certification among two different classes of private equity backed 
firms, buyouts and venture capital firms. Based on information asymmetry theory and value 
adding mechanisms models, we contend that the certification power of buyout and venture capital 
firms will differ ultimately reflecting on different degrees of underpricing and underperformance. 
Using standard methodologies we test the different levels of underpricing and underperformance 
among buyout and venture capital backed firms. We construct a Nordic sample of private equity 
sponsored entities that became public within a time horizon of ten years between 1998 and 2008. 
The results show that for the first day of trading venture capital backed firms are overpriced by 
1,1%, while buyouts backed firms show underpricing of 8,4%. Concordantly, in the long run 
venture capital backed firms tend to over perform buyout sponsored entities by an average of 1,3% 
per month. While underperformance results are in line with prior empirical evidence the 
underpricing findings seem to be contradictive. Our results pose additional questions regarding 
the certifying ability of private equity sponsors in addition to the specific characteristic of the 
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Facebook’s initial public offering (IPO) has resurfaced controversial questions regarding the 
effectiveness of the market’s self-controlling mechanisms. Unsuccessful issuances have powerful 
ripple effects that distress equity markets but that ultimately affect the economy as a whole. Thus, 
underpricing and underperformance have been two of the most extensively researched topics 
regarding initial public offerings. A number of theories have placed information asymmetry as 
the main driving force behind the underpricing and underperformance phenomena. In the present 
study we examine the ability of private equity firms (PE) to ameliorate information asymmetries 
through reputational capital and certification. To achieve these objectives, we investigate two 
specific types of IPO`s; issuances backed by venture capital (VC) and buyout (BO) firms. 
 
There is no universal consensus to explain underpricing and underperformance. Information 
asymmetry is often referred to as the underlying explanation to underpricing. While investors are 
weary of bad issuers, underwriters try to assess the market’s demand for the new issue. It has 
been popularly believed that issuers and underwriters try to ameliorate information asymmetry 
through a discount premium on the offering price. The assumption of underpricing as a sign of 
quality emphasizes the issuers’ quality and ability to recover the money of the IPO discount. 
When investigating the post IPO long stock performance empirical evidence has shown that non 
backed IPO entities underperform relative to the market. While underperformance transcends 
countries and industry specific characteristics research has not been able to give a universal 
explanation to this phenomena. The explanations are both endogenous and exogenous to the 
company’s performance and center in market timing, agency conflicts and optimal decision 
making 
 
This study focuses on the differences in certification and reputational capital between two classes 
of Private Equity (PE) firms Buyout (BO) and Venture Capital (VC) firms. Previous research has 
suggested that BO and VC are similar in terms of the extent of involvement and contribution they 
have on the issuer’s performance. However, some of the fundamental differences between these 
two entities lie within the type of investments they undergo and the methods used to create value. 




larger and more mature companies. Concordantly, BOs companies, compared to VCs, are more 
prone to obtain the majority control of the firms they invest in. Furthermore, there is evidence 
that PE backed firms are able to ameliorate the information asymmetry ex-ante IPO. We make 
the case that the levels of certification between VC and BO differ from each other and can affect 
not only the first day return, but also the long run stock performance.  
 
Compared to the US and other European countries the Nordic Private Equity industry is relatively 
young completing its first exit in the late 90`s. The Nordic PE market continued growing 
throughout the late 2000’s representing approximately 10% of the European fundraising. Limited 
studies have been performed in the Nordics testing for underpricing and underperformance of PE 
backed entities.  After thorough research and rigorous screening process we identify 104 BO and 
VC backed IPO`s firms that had become public between the years of 1998 and 2008.  
 
Despite being statistically insignificant, we find the test results to be of interest. The first day 
returns show VC backed entities to be overpriced by 1,1% while BO backed firms are 
underpriced by 8,4%. The overpricing contradicts prior empirical evidence and suggests that 
certain market mechanisms push the offering price above the market’s perceived value. In the 
long run our results shows that VC backed firms over perform a benchmark index in all our tests 
while BO backed firms tend to underperform. On average the VC backed firms outperform the 
BO backed by approximately 14,5% a year. Despite aligning with prior empirical evidence our 












2 Underpricing and Underperformance 
 
An Initial Public Offering (IPO) consists of a firm listing a portion of its shares in a stock 
exchange to serve as an institution of trade (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001).  The IPO process 
can be thought of as a pricing mechanism and a mean to create liquidity. The public listing is 
seen as an opportunity for the investor to value, trade and divest on his investment (Brau and 
Fawcett, 2006). In this process a financial institution, the underwriter, serves as an intermediary 
between the market and the issuing company. The underwriter values the firm, estimates an 
indicative price range and sets the offering price to the market. There are information 
asymmetries in this process that can create differences between the market’s and the 
underwriter’s valuation. Information asymmetries between the issuing company, the underwriter 
and the market affect their perception of the value of the stock price. As a result the closing price 
at the first day of trading tends to be higher than the offering price. This is known as the 
underpricing phenomena or first day returns. A positive first day returns means that the issuing 
company will lose money in favor of the investors during the first day of trading. While earlier 
theory focused on the United States IPO market it has become very well documented that 
underpricing is an international phenomena. In average the underpricing of new issues in 
industrialized countries is 15 to 18 percent while in developing countries is significantly higher 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001).  
The information asymmetries forces that existed prior to the IPO event are reduced as the 
performance of the company reveal its true value. This enables the stock prices to adjust in 
accordance to the market’s demand. Ritter (1991) shows evidence of negative abnormal returns 
over a three year time horizon.  Taking a sample of 1,526 IPOs and matching it to equivalent 
industry and sized companies Ritter finds that while the newly issued companies had a three year 
return of 34.47% the benchmark had performed at a 61.86% during the period of 1975-1984. A 
number of similar studies testing longer time horizons and different markets confirm the 
underperformance phenomenon Lerner (1994), Loughran and Ritter (1995, 2000), Baker and 
Wurgler (2000) and Hirshleifer (2001). While some scholars have suggested irrational behavior 
and a deviation from optimal decision making as the most plausible theory for underpricing, this 
explanation deviates from the classical view of a self-regulating market Schultz (2001).  




Brav, Geczy and Gompers (2000) show evidence that through an accurate measurement of excess 
returns the long run performance disappears.   
There have been several attempts to shed light on underpricing and underperformance, yet, there 
is no universal consensus among researchers to explain these phenomena. Theories stemming 
from information asymmetries such as signaling, insurance liability, hot issue markets and 
mispricing have been suggested as potential explanations. Draho (2001) suggests that poor 
returns can be explained through market mispricing and poor responsiveness to new information. 
He states that rational investors would arbitrage prices downwards to reduce the chances of 
underperformance. The existence of underperformance hence would suggest anomalies in a self-
regulating market. Following, we present an overview of the most relevant theories explaining 
underpricing and underperformance of new issues.  
 
2.1 Explaining Underpricing and Underperformance 
2.1.1 Information Asymmetry 
 
The problem of information asymmetry was first raised by Hayek (1945). Hayek explains the 
importance of possessing relevant information in an economic rational order and describes scatter 
information as an endemic problem of this order.  He acknowledges that the market’s problems 
lay not only in how to allocate resources but also in how to best utilize “the knowledge not given 
to anyone in its totality”. He suggests that the defragmented nature of the market’s knowledge is 
not to be solved by concentrating it centrally but rather through an aggregate process of 
interactions between all the holders of partial knowledge.   
 
Following Hayek’s idea of defragmented market knowledge George Akerlof tries to shed light on 
the issue of quality and uncertainty through the automobile market model. Akerlof (1970)  
explains how the automobile market is laden with uncertainty as buyers and sellers possess 
asymmetric information about the qualities of the cars. This asymmetry makes cars of different 
quality standards be priced equally as it is impossible for buyers to distinguish between good cars 
and “lemons”. Akerlof contends that most cars traded will be lemons as the bad cars will tend to 





The concept of information asymmetry and uninformed traders was later taken into the financial 
markets by Sanford Grossman (1975). Grossman presents a dual model that illustrates how 
informed and uninformed traders invest on information and how this dynamic reflects on current 
prices. Grossman suggests the potential existence of “over-informationally” efficient markets that 
would reveal enough information to prevent informed investors to earn returns for their 
investment in information. With this model Grossman illustrates how prices convey information 
to investors. Later on in his paper “On the Efficiency of Competitive Stock Markets where 
Trades have Diverse Information” (1976) Grossman follows the premise of prices conveying 
information and he creates a mean variance model to study how the prices aggregate segmented 
information. In this model Grossman proposes that price perfectly aggregates information within 
a context of uncertainty or “noise”. Moreover, this model depicts the dichotomy of investing in 
information namely; when a price system perfectly aggregates information it creates and adverse 
incentive for data collection.  
 
2.1.2 Certification: Bridging information asymmetry 
 
Certification has been present in economic theory and has taken different forms. Klein and 
Leffler (1981) had suggested the idea of unsalvageable capital and increased market prices as 
means to convey and warrant quality. The first concept refers to the level of assurance on the 
buyer’s side expressed as a capital commitment in the good being offered.  Conversely, Klein and 
Leffler suggest that the price would signal a superior quality when information asymmetry 
prevents the buyer to know the true quality of the offer. Price signaling drives its value not from 
price concentration of information but rather as proof of the company’s commitment i.e. 
unsalvageable capital. In an economic environment and within the context of IPO we can find the 
concept of unsalvageable capital through certification theory. Booth and Smith (1986) showed 
that firm value could be increased if “bonding investments are made to certify new issue price”.  
 
In this paper we present what we consider are two of the most relevant IPO certification 
mechanisms influencing underpricing and underperformance namely; underwriter and sponsor 




CFOs found that the strongest way of signaling quality, apart from having strong cash flows, was 
to have an underwriter with strong reputational capital. Furthermore, consistent with Megginson 
and Weiss (1991), Brav and Gompers (1997), Schöber (2008), Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck 
(2010) and Cao (2011) PE backed firms have proven to ameliorate information asymmetry while 
positively reflecting on both underpricing and underperformance.  
2.1.3 Underwriter’s Reputation 
 
Booth and Smith (1986) present a model that places significant value on the underwriter’s in the 
IPO process through its ability of certifying quality. Departing from the effects of information 
asymmetry Booth and Smith contend that an underwriter, through its market reputation, certifies 
an issue effectively ameliorating the gap between investors’ and issuers’ information asymmetry. 
If underwriters manipulate information they will lose a perpetuity or quasi rent in favor of a large 
onetime gain. Hence, the underwriter has a positive incentive to perform an accurate certification 
of the company. The study also shows that issuers can increase the firm’s value if the company is 
able to benefit from the underwriters reputation. This to a large extent will be determined by the 
level of involvement of the investment bank in the issuers’ public offering.  
 
Sun, Lee, Li and Jin (2010) try to understand the effects of underwriter’s reputation on the 
issuer’s earnings management prior and after an initial public offering. Sun states that 
management utilizes discretionary accounting within the legal parameters of the general accepted 
accounting principles in accordance to the need of a company under certain events. He considers 
in the second case that since there exist a “well established” correlation between share prices and 
earnings it is possible that an incentive for earnings management could increase prior to a IPO.  
His hypothesis tries to prove whether there is a negative relation between underwriters’ 
reputation and earnings management prior to the IPO and whether there is a positive relation in 
operating performance after the issue. The study is able to prove both hypothesis and it explains 
the hypothesis through the interest of the underwriter before and after the issue. Since reputation 
is invaluable for highly reputable underwriters in future issues there is a higher incentive for them 
to estimate more accurately the value of the company prior to the IPO while monitoring the 





2.2 Theories of Underpricing 
2.2.1 Signaling 
 
There has been empirical evidence suggesting that there is an incentive for companies to 
underprice their shares as a mean to signal the quality and projected value of a firm. In “Signaling 
by Underpricing in the IPO Market” Allen and Faulhaber (1989) build a model that attempts to 
illustrate the circumstances and context in which underpricing would be desirable for the issuer. 
He divides his sample into good and bad firms based on their expected dividend stream. The 
stream is dependent upon two instances of the IPO which in term bear different levels of 
information asymmetry i.e. planning and execution of innovation. These two instances are said to 
be different in that the investors don’t hold enough information about the quality of the 
innovation of the issuer. The innovation that the issuer is trying to implement is unknown to the 
investors. The information gap remains after implementation and is only through the first 
payment of dividends that the investors are able to readjust their original perceptions of the 
company. The conclusions of his work found that when information asymmetry exists there will 
be an incentive to underprice. Allen finds that all things being equal companies will be less 
underprice should they not issue equity within a reasonable amount of time prior to the IPO. His 
work also suggests a higher level of underpricing in the case of venture capital involvement. 
2.2.2 Insurance to Underwriter Liabilities  
 
In his work “Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of Common Stock” (1988) Tunic explores the 
possibility of underpricing acting as an insurance mechanism for unforeseen liabilities arising 
after the initial public offering process. Tunic contends that as underpricing rewards the investor 
with an initial stock price lower than the aftermarket value, the reward would ameliorate the 
probabilities of a potential legal suit brought against the issuer. Tunic hypothesis states that 
companies that have higher exposure to legal liabilities would tend to increase the discount on the 
initial offer compared to companies which legal risk is low. To test this hypothesis Tunic 
analyzes issuances that took place both before and after the Securities Act of 1933. His results 
confirm that the Act of 1933 had a deep impact in the pricing and returns of unseasoned new 




these results are perfectly compatible with earlier data asymmetry hypothesis he questions the 
extent to which the underpricing phenomena can be by explained exclusively through one 
hypothesis.  
2.2.3  Hot and cold Issue Markets  
 
In light of the investors’ avid enthusiasm for new issues during the period of 1961-1962 Reilly 
(1977) study tries to understand the reason triggering this unusual behavior. The study assumes a 
downward bias in the new issues’ stock price and suggests some reasons to explain why this is 
the case namely; ameliorate uncertainty of the public’s valuation, increase probability of the 
success of issue or decrease the time in which the stocks sell. While Reilly notes that the issuers 
could be sensitive to the cash left behind, he argues that corporations are not looking to obtain all 
their planned capital through the initial public offering as they could increase the price of the 
stock in future issues inasmuch as they keep investors satisfied. Draho (2004) states that during 
periods of hot issue market first day returns tend to be higher. While 18% first day return is the 
rule in the American IPO market, the internet hot market  
 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) investigate the nature of hot issue markets and its implications in stock 
price and aftermarket performance. They find that the presence of hot/cold issue months suggests 
the probability of following hot/cold issue months is higher. However, he notes that the results 
are stationary and acknowledges that this tendency will only last for a limited amount of time. 
The results also indicate that cold market could prove to be more profitable for investors as they 
could potentially obtain higher offering prices. 
2.2.4  Irrational Herding 
 
In “Rational herding in financial economics” Devenow and Welch (1996) describe herding as a 
common phenomenon in financial economics. He recognizes two different types of herding non 
rational and rational. The first one involves investors following each other behavior without 
regards for any rational analysis. Rational herding on the other hand is the phenomena in which 
optimal decision making is hampered by noise and information asymmetry. The study of herding 
is based on Principal Agent models that analyze the breach between optimal decision making and 




decision making has to do with the agent’s reputation. In order to maximize their reputation in the 
market agents would either decide to “hide in the herd” to be less evaluable or “ride in the herd” 
to signal quality. These models tend to show that agents, when the market is moving inefficiently, 
tend to ignore their own research or other optimal decision making. 
2.2.5 Cost Theory 
 
Beneviste and Spindt (1989) suggested a cost related theory that places the underwriter as a 
facilitator for market efficiency.  They illustrate their theory with the example of a new financial 
institution trying to sell equities in the market. Since the market has little knowledge of the new 
company investors are weary of their equity products. Hemce, the entity is force to create a 
mechanism to attract investors by reducing their risk aversion. Beneviste and Spindt contend that 
underpricing is a natural consequence of the entity’s need to create reputation capital within the 
market. Hence, they understand underpricing as a risk premium given to investors to reward them 
for their risk. Furthermore, they show that the underwriter ability to leverage its expected future 
cash flows to increase efficiency and hence reduce underpricing.  
 
2.2.6 Winner’s Curse 
 
The winners curse suggests that the highest bidding investor has necessarily the highest valuation 
among all participants. Hence, this implies that the winner could pay more than the fair value of 
the issue. This problem creates an incentive for investors to exert downward pressure on the 
issue’s price. Conversely, Rock’s (1986) model illustrates how the information asymmetries 
between different investors can create a negative incentive to uninformed investors to participate 
in an auction. If it is the case that informed investors possess more information about the issuer 
than uninformed investors then uninformed investors would always win when there is a bad issue 
and could lose in the case of good issues. Hence, this could potentially create a negative incentive 




2.3 Theories of Underperformance 
2.3.1 Signaling 
 
Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that signaling rather than predict after IPO 
underperformances requires positive post market returns. Since, companies are trying to signal 
their quality underpricing would be desirable only if a “high-quality” firm was able to outperform 
non issuing firms in both price and performance. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist state that defining a 
“high-quality” company on a testable context has is difficult due to the subjectivity of the term. 
Moreover, there is not enough empirical evidence to prove the criteria needed to make 
underperformance desirable. 
 
2.3.2 Legal Liability 
 
Hughes and Thakor (1992) suggest that while the underpricing phenomena can be explained 
through their legal insurance model, so can underperformance as long as the issuer is co-liable of 
damages along with the underwriter. In this context Hughes and Thakor refer to damages as 
additional “dividends” that are to be paid to the stockholders. Hughes and Thakor model is based 
on the premise that IPO investors are acquiring a package that bundles shares and a “litigation 
put”. In this way investors would be able to recover a fraction of the losses from the issuer. 
Hence, they argue that when computing underperformance, failing to control for the litigation put 
will render spurious results. Janet Alexander (1993) contends this view claiming that “litigation 
dividends” are not available during the period of time when underperformance is detected namely; 
the first three or five years of trading. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist (2001) argue that legal liability is 
not economically significant in many countries thus making the legal liability explanation 
unlikely.     
2.3.3 Agency Cost 
 
Jensen and Mecklins (1976) have explained poor operative performance as a misalignment in the 
interest of management and shareholders. This theory translated into the post IPO context suggest 




longer be in line with the company’s interests. Mikkelson et al. (1997) tests US based company’s 
and found a positive relationship between operative performance and management stake on the 
company. While this theory has some weight in financial literature there has been empirical 
evidence that questions agency theory as the major factor determining underpricing.  Cai and Wei 
(1997) study the Japanese equity market and fail to find a relationship between changes in 
management ownership and profitability. Additionally, Loughran and Ritter (1997) link their 
1995 study of seasoned equity low stock returns with the operative performance of seasoned 
firms. Loughran and Ritter contend the Jensen and Mecklins agency cost explanation to 






3 Buyouts and Venture Capital Transactions 
 
The Private Equity Industry consist of a variety of transaction types entities where buyout (BO) 
and Venture Capital (VC) firms stand out as the most distinct.  Academic literature has not yet 
agreed on a scientific definition of buyout firms Schöber (2008). As a whole, BO firms consist of 
several sub categories such as Leverage Buyouts, Acquisition Vehicle and initial investments in 
Non-VC firms Schöber (2008). The BO and VC firms have distinctive characteristics which 
distinguish them from each other and other non-backed backed investments. Compared to a non-
backed transaction, both BO and VC will acquire a concentrated portion of the target’s equity. 
Additionally, they partake in a more active role in the portfolio entities operations, hence 
contributing substantially in its performance. To compare the typical investment target of a BO 
and a VC we turn to Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) own description of Buyout industry. The 
financial criterion for a target BO is typically above average profit margins with strong and 
predicable cashflow and separable assets which are available for sale, if necessary.  Some of the 
business characteristics are strong market positions, potential for real growth in the future and 
products which are not subject to cyclical swings or technologic changes (KKR, 1989). On the 
other hand will a VC only invest in firms with high growth potential, often start-ups with 
technology or innovation aspects Barry (1990).  
Barry (1990) highlights some of the representative characteristics of the VC industry. VC firms 
are active investors and add value through involvement, participation in management, contribute 
with specialized knowledge within an industry sector, recruit key personnel, set up distribution 
lines and contribute with consulting services (Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypens, 1990). 
The nature of the BO transactions is to buy a majority stake of the entity from its previous private 
or public owners. The entity and its management will go through a series of changes in its capital 
structure, management incentives and corporate governance (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2009). 
Beyond the structural dissimilarities of BOs and VCs there are significant differences in the way 
these entities create value. The different value adding mechanisms could have an impact in the 
backed-entity’s operational performance ultimately affecting the markets’ perception of the new 
issue. This assumption is in accordance to empirical evidence showing differences between 








Table 1: Overview of Value Creation Mechanisms by Buyouts and Venture Capital sponsors 
 
3.1 Buyout Transactions 
 
Jensen (1989) et al suggests buyouts, as a value creating vehicle, risen during the 80s.  He credits 
the success of the new buyout market to a superior corporate and capital structure model. The 
combination of ownership, incentives to private equity professionals and an efficient 
organizational structure were believed to be the cornerstones fueling the industry’s growth. 
Despite the success the next decade saw most of BO deals defaulting putting an end to the first 
BO era. During the period of the 1990s to early 2000s the BO industry experienced a dramatic 
change abandoning most public-to-private acquisitions surviving poorly on private-to-private 
deals. It was not until the second half of the 2000s that the BO public to private acquisition 
reemerged. The growth of the BO market has been exponential and shows no signs of slowing 
down. While at the beginning of 1990s investments in private equity totaled 10 billion USD at the 
peak of the 2000s it increased to an outstanding 180 billion USD (Reyes, Private Equity 
Overview and Update 2002).  
 
When trying to understand how BO where able to create value Guo (2011) suggests that most of 
the evidence points out to large gains in operative income.  He explains operative income gains 
through a reduction in agency cost, improved governance via financial sponsors and central 
ownership. Guo studies whether LBOs have changed the way they create value over time. 
Through testing the returns of 192 LBOs for the period of 1990 to 2006 and comparing it against 




deals. Initially, he finds that companies in recent BO deals are priced more conservatively 
compared to those in the 1980’s. While the levels of leverage are considerably lower in more 
recent deals, they exert substantial default risk to the companies. His research shows that in 
average the total value of firms increased after the buyout. He explains this increase in value 
through the liquidation of unproductive assets while maximizing the efficiency of the remaining 
assets, rising market or industry sector valuation and larger tax shields.   
3.1.1 Underpricing 
 
Hogan, Olson, Kish (2001) study analyzes the first day returns performance of LBO and compare 
it to original IPOs. Their results show that while original IPOs had an initial return of 13% LBOs 
had a mean excess return of 7.64%. The study is consistent with the information asymmetry 
theory as the underpricing is significantly reduced when companies have BO backing. While the 
study finds that factors such as the number of months the LBO was privately held, overallotment 
option, the size of issue, insider ownership   and the gross spread to have an impact in the returns 
other factors such as the lead underwriter, whether the deal was syndicated, the number of 
managers, listing exchange, lockup agreements and auditors proved to have no impact in the 
returns. These results contrast with other studies that show the later factors to have an impact on 
returns. Overallotment and insider participation are shown to be more significant in explaining 
underpricing for LBO deals than for original IPOs while in the case of the size of the offering the 
opposite is true.  
3.1.2 Underperformance 
 
Schöber (2008) studies a sample of BO backed firms to look into their IPO performance. He finds 
that during the first year BO backed companies have a positive performance benchmarked to the 
S&P 500. Contrarily, non BO backed firms underperform considerably in the short run. The 
results in the medium and long term however are similar as both LBO backed and non-backed  
companies had a negative performance. However, while BO non backed companies experienced 
negative returns of -51% during the fourth year of the time horizon, BO backed companies’ 
underperformance was considerably milder with a -16.6% return. This suggests that the 




that his results could be explained by a greater interest of investment bankers on the company as 
there is more information available about BO companies. Additionally, he believes that 
management experience in leading public companies make them more proficient in terms of 
operational performance. This last claim is backed by his study showing that 10% of the non-
backed companies went bankrupt compared to only a 5% of BO backed. Schöber results could be 
further confirmed by Cao (2011) that shows that operative performance of BO backed companies 
experience no significant decline on their operative performance post IPO.   
3.1.3 Certification 
 
Despite a gap in theory regarding BO certification we can draw some important parallels from the 
work of Megginson and Weiss (1991) with regards to the influence of BO firms in the IPO 
process. Despite the differences between the value adding strategies of VC and BO we contend 
that BO firms’ reputation exerts a certification influence similar to that of VC firms. Furthermore, 
highly reputable BO firms’ management team in addition to a higher transparency in cash flows 
can reduced ex-ante information asymmetry related issues in the IPO process. Consistent with 
these views along with Booth and Smith (1986) theory of certification, the results of Hogan, 
Olson and Kish (2001) and Schöber (2008) can further suggest the BO firms’ power of 
certification. However, research has shown Prior research has shown that the alphas of BO and 
VC differ in the long run Ljungvist and Richardson (2003), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), 
Kaplan and Schoar (2004).    
 
3.2 Venture Capital Transactions 
 
The Venture Capital industry can be tracked back to the dawn of the 1970’s. It was not until the 
end of the 1970’s that the VC industry grew to about 211 VC companies with an aggregate 
industry capital of 2.5 billion USD. One decade later the number of VC companies nearly tripled 
and the total industry capital grew to 31 billion Venture Economics (1988). The growth was short 
from over and during the peak of the 2000’s the VC industry had already a total of 105 billion 
USD in investments Gompers (2004). This growth has been spurred by small high growth 
innovative companies developing new technology. These inherent characteristics of VC backed 





Sørensen (2007) has suggested that the value creation mechanisms of Venture Capital firms are 
twofold namely; influence and sorting. He points out that the extent of value added to a company 
is intrinsically attached to the reputation and experience of the VC. It’s throughout this 
reputational capital that VCs are able to grant access to a larger network of clients, suppliers and 
management team than less experienced VC (influence).  More experienced VCs are also 
believed to be able to monitor and better managed their companies (influence). Additionally, the 
reputational capital of VCs can signal unobserved characteristic to public market. Hsu (2004)** 
In fact shows that companies would accept the offers from VCs with the highest reputational 
capital at the expense of more economically attractive offers. This effect in turn allows VCs with 
more experience and reputation to have a higher and better pool of companies to draw from. 
Further, Sørensen argues that companies backed by VC investors with more experienced will be 




Recently Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck (2010) has taken a closer look at underpricing and long 
performance of issues backed by venture capital and private equity firms. In their study Hadryd, 
Mietzner and Shciereck argue that a major consideration for underpricing and positive 
performance would be the magnitude of information asymmetry signaled by the issuer to the 
investor. Under the assumption that underpricing is a negative function of financial sponsor 
reputation he tries to distinguish between PE and VC to analyze whether a difference in 
underpricing or long term performance is observable. He distinguishes PE from VC through the 
nature of the companies being funded i.e. VC would be smaller high-growth companies while PE 
targets would have a higher degree of maturity. Additionally he argues that the market for VC 
companies is not as concentrated as the PE market. Comparatively, he considers those PE targets 
are more stable and better positioned within their industry. Due to this differences he predicts that 
PE backed IPOs will have smaller returns and lower underpricing compared to VC backed 
companies. The study confirms that the level of underpricing is higher in VC than in PE backed 






Brav and Gompers (1997) examine a sample of VC and non VC issues to determine whether 
there is a significant difference in their long-run performance. Additionally, the study analyzes 
whether different benchmarks and methods of measuring performance could render different 
results. Replicating Ritter (1991) and Ritter and Loughan (1995) model Brav and Gompers (1997) 
are able to show that the returns of non-venture backed IPOs are considerably below those of 
venture backed companies. Moreover, the results also suggests that underpricing could be a 




Megginson and Weiss (1991) in their paper “Venture Capitalists Certification in Initial Public 
Offerings” study how the presence of venture capital investment can certify the initial public 
offering of an issuer. The authors contend that the presence of highly reputable VC can work as a 
substitute or compliment to other certification in the IPO process i.e. auditors and investment 
bankers. Using matched pairs methodology between companies similar in size and industry 
Megginson and Weiss are able to confirm that the presence of a VC maximizes the fraction of the 
proceeds accrued to the issuer in an IPO. According to their results the presence of a VC reduces 
the degree of underpricing as well as the underwriters spread. Conversely, their research suggests 
that VC backed firms were able to bring more attractive auditors and underwriters as well as a 









4 The Nordic Market 
4.1 The Stock Exchanges  
 
The Nordic market is particularly intertwined and shares market specific characteristics. 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden have merged into the Nasdaq OMX and operate jointly with 
Norex. Westerholm (2006) argues that some of the institutional characteristics of the OMX differ 
from European markets where new issues had risen and crashed between 1998 and 2001. He 
explains that the OMX organizes new listings inside the same exchange or with the aim of later 
filing for the central exchange. The central exchange will typically consist of stricter 
requirements in terms of size and shareholders dispersion. 
 
 
Table 2: Listing requirements among Nordic Countries - Source: Westerholm (2006), P.29. 
 
The Nordic stock exchange has been continuously evolving in the late 2000’s.  The Swedish 
listing Nye Marknaden (NM) changed name to First North in June 2006 and in the following 
years OMX duplicated the model to its remaining Nordic branches. In August 2007 the 
Norwegian Oslo Børs merged its two lists SMB and Main list into one. The introductory 
requirements of SMB where replaced by the new list Oslo Axess (Eikrem, 2007). 
Exchange Company Size Number of Shareholders Other requirements
and sprad ownership
Sweden OMX-integrated markets
A-list Market value 31.8 M€ 200, 25% of shares and 10% Minimum share price of 25 SEK
(300 MSEK) of votes with < 100% holdings List requires 3 years of audited
O-list No specific size requirement 500 spread as above profitable financial statements
Finland OMX-integrated markets
Main List Market value of 35 M€ 500, 25% of shares and 3 years audited financials 
(blue chip) Share capital 2 M€ 10% of voters with 2 years of financial statements
Equity 4 M€ <10 % holdings 1 year of financial staments if operative
I-list (mid-cap) Market value 4 M€ 15% publicly held  <2 years. New shares have to be issued
NM-list (growth) Market Value 2 M€ 10% publicly held  if <3 years. Large holdings locked up
Norway. Oslo Stock Exchange
Main List Marekt value 37.6 M€ 1000, 25% publicly held 3 years of financial statements, for main
(300 M NOK) list one profitable year. Since 2001, 
SMB Marekt value 1 M€ 100, 25% publicly held high-growth  companies with no current
(8 M NOK)  earnings must have suffiecient liquid 
Primary capital certificates Marekt value 1 M€ 200, 25% publicly held assets to  operate for 18 moths
(8 M NOK)
Denmark. CPH Stock Exchange
Main Share capital at least 2.01 M€ 500, Shares freely Operated more than three years
( 15 MDKK) negotiable





4.2 The Private Equity Industry 
 
While the US BO and VC industry can be traced back to the mid-80s and late 70s, the Nordic 
markets did not emerge until the mid-90s. Since its rather late introduction the Nordics have 
established as an important market in the PE industry. In the 2006-2008 period Nordic PE 
fundraising totaled 27.8 € billion, equivalent to 10% of total funds raised in Europe (EVCA, 
2009). In January 2012 the Nordic (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) Venture Capital 
Association, an independent organization for PE firms, was constituted by 250 members. Yet 
more than half of the capital was collected by six fund raisers alone, all from Sweden. As 
displayed in the table below, the Swedish accounted for 75% of all the funds raised in the period, 
giving them the title of being the biggest PE market in the Nordics.  
 
 
Table 3: Fundraising by country in Nordic Region (2006-2008). Source: EVCA – 2009 Nordic 
Report, P.10. 
Studies of the capital flow in the Nordic Venture Capital market show that the majority of 
investments are made by national funds located in their country of incorporation. Between 2006 
and 2008 approximately 30% of the funding was originated from Non-Nordic European investors 
(EVCA, 2009). During this period also the region experienced a significant amount of cross 
border interaction between the Nordic markets. Concordantly, during the period between 2007 
and 2010, the total shares of venture investment received from other Nordic countries was as 
follows, Denmark (12%), Finland (20%), Norway (6%) and Sweden (15%)  Maula (2010). 
The PE Industry`s activity fluctuates with economic cycles. The Nordic equity market has shown 
a formidable growth that began at the end of the 1990’s. In terms of investment exits value 
increased during the booms of the 1999-2004 and 2005-2010 periods Creandum (2011). The 
distribution of fund raising and investment exits varies over the economic cycles. From the funds 
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Total
Funds raised in €Bn 1,4 2,2 3,3 20,6 27,5








raised in the 2006-2008 period, approximately 58% and 89% in 2007 and 2008 were identified as 
BO funds. Early stage- and later stage Venture Capital represented on average 18% in 2007, 
where the Europe wide-average is 13% EVCA (2009). The Nordic region is said to be one of the 
most attractive regions for a VC, as the countries are ranked high in “Best Countries to start a 
company”, “R&D as % of GDP”, “Global competitiveness index” and “Corruption  Perception 
Index” (Small Business Administration’s Office of Advocacy, OECD (2010) Factbook, World 
Economic Forum, Transparency international CPI (2010), Creandum (2011). The highly qualified 
labor in addition to transparent business practices and favorable regulation policies are said to be 
factors fostering the growth in the Nordic PE market Westerholm (2006). 
Trade sales were the preferred vehicle of PE firms to disinvestments in 2008, accounting for 
almost 25% of the exits. Other popular exits are sales to other private equity houses, repayment 
of principal loans, sales to management and write-off`s. Public offerings on the other hand only 
accounted for 8% and 4% in 2007 and 2008. In the same years, the disinvestment by sector for 
the BO and VC is displayed in Table 4. The exit in volume is greater than of the VC and their 
target sectors differ. The BO tend to have a more even distribution of exits across the sectors, 
while having a greater weight on “Business & Industrial products/services”. The VC`s have 
seemingly a relatively high focus on “communications”, “Computer & Electronics” and “Life 
Science”. 
 
Table 4: Disinvestment by Sectoral distribution of Buyout & growth and Venture Capital in € 
million, (2007 – h1 2009), source; EVCA Nordic Report, 2009, P.25 and P.32. 








Consumer goods & retail
Construction
Computer & consumer electronics
Communications
Chemicals and materials
Business & industrial services







5 Hypothesis  
Since this study centers in both underpricing and underperformance, we present two hypotheses 
that aim to explore these two phenomena in a PE context. Both hypotheses try to predict the 
differences in first day and long run returns of both BO and VC backed entities. We based our 
reasoning on prior economic theory and financial empirical evidence.  
5.1 Hypothesis I 
 
Consistent with Hayek (1945), Akerlof (1970) and Grossman (1975, 1976), we acknowledge the 
importance of conveying quality through strong market mechanisms as a way to ameliorate 
information asymmetry gaps. Signaling, insurance to underwriter liabilities, hot and cold issues 
and irrational herding, have taken information asymmetry as the departing point to explain 
underpricing. These theories explain underpricing as a way to convince the market of the quality 
of an issue. Klein and Leffler’s (1981) concept of unsalvageable capital as a company’s 
commitment to signal quality, suggests the possibility of certification as a guarantee to investors.   
Booth and Smith (1986) support this view by suggesting the possibility of increasing a firm’s 
value through bonding investments that certify a new issue. Megginson and Weiss (1991), Brav 
and Gompers (1997), Schöber (2008), Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck (2010), and Cao (2011) 
confirm this through empirical evidence showing that PE backed firms have proven to ameliorate 
information asymmetry by conveying superior quality to the market.  
 
Despite the ability of PE backed firms to certify issuers, we believe that the extent to which they 
do so can vary among sponsors ultimately reflecting on the underpricing and underperformance 
of a new issues. Since VC and BO sponsors create value utilizing dissimilar mechanisms we 
contend that these differences will create diverse levels of certification. The different levels of 
certification would derive from the effectiveness of BO and VC mechanisms to bridge 
information asymmetry gaps. Despite VC firms’ ability to certify issuers, we believe their ability 
to ameliorate the uncertainty stemming from future performance is lower compared to that of BO 
backed firms. As per Brau and Fawcett (2006) showing cash flows as one of the most powerful 
vehicles to convey quality, we believe that BO should show less underpricing compared to VCs 






  : Entities sponsored by venture capital firms will present higher underpricing than companies 
backed by buyout sponsors. We state the null and alternative hypothesis as follows. 
 
  :                                                           
  :                                                           
5.2 Hypothesis II 
 
While in underpricing the sponsors’ certifying effect can be explain through information 
asymmetry we consider that in the long run it’s the sponsors’ ability to create value that affects 
the issuers’ performance. While VCs are known to invest on early stage and high growth 
companies, BO will add value through efficacy and market timing mechanisms Jensen (1989). In 
other words, VC growth could be linked to growth in cash flows and sales while this would not 
be the case for BO backed entities. Consistent with the findings of Brau and Fawcett (2006) that 
cash flows send investors a stronger sign of strong performance and enhanced value, we consider 
that VC backed firms’ stock performance will be better than for BO backed firms. The rational is 
in accordance with Ljungvist and Richardson (2003), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Kaplan 
and Schoar (2004) studies showing higher alphas for firms backed by VC compared to BO 
backed firms in the long run. While these studies have several limitations in terms of their 
selection biased and their assumptions of BO’s beta being equal to one, we consider that they 
show evidence of the existence of our value adding hypothesis. Furthermore, it gives BOs and 
VCs different dimensions of certifications when looking at long term returns.   
 
   : Entities sponsored by venture capital firms will present lower underperformance compared 
to companies backed by buyout sponsors.  We state the null and alternative hypothesis as follows: 
 
  :                                                                   







In this chapter we first present the methodologies used to measure and compare underpricing 
between VC and BO. Subsequently, we introduce some of the most commonly used approaches 
to measure long term underperformance among newly issued stock. Underpricing and 
Underperformance methodologies have not been internationally standardized (Schöber, 2008). To 
introduce and explain the reasoning behind our models we present a brief discussion of the most 
relevant methodologies to date. We present an overview of our selected methodologies in Panel 1.  
 
Panel 1: Overview of Selected Methodologies for testing Underpricing and Underperformance 
6.1 Underpricing 
 
The methodologies involved in measuring underpricing have differed greatly throughout time. 
Schöber (2008) has noted that returns are calculated within different post IPO-after market 
periods across academic literature. Furthermore, while most scholars have chosen raw initial 
returns as their preferred methodology to measure first day returns others have made the case in 
favor of adjusted initial returns. Perhaps one of the greatest disagreements among scholars 
consists of what quoted price should be used in computing the first day returns. Academic 
BO VC Period Frequency
1998
Underpricing: 2008
Methodology First Day return: (BO, VC, BO in excess of VC)
Sample Metrics Offering Price, Raw Closing Price
(Significance test) (Two Tailed - Independent t-test)
BO VC Period Frequency
01.09.1998
Underperformance: 01.09.2010
Methodology The Cumulative Abnormal Return – Calendar Time: (BO, VC, BO in excess of VC)
Sample Metrics  Market Value (MV), Total Return Index (RI), 
(Significance test) (Two Tailed - Independent t-test)
Methodology Single Factor Regression – CAPM: (BO, VC, BO in excess of VC)
Sample Metrics (MV), (RI)
(Significance test) (P-Values)
Methodology Three Factor Regression – Fama-French (2012): (BO, VC, BO in excess of VC)















literature shows closing prices, bid prices, mean between bid and ask prices as valid methods to 
calculate first day returns. Per Beatty and Ritter (1986) claim that market returns are very small 
compared to adjust for them, we utilize unadjusted offering and closing prices. 
 
                
                                    
                 
 
In order to compare the levels of underpricing between BO and VC backed firms we performed a 
Two-Tailed Independent t-test on first day returns.  
 
       
  ̅̅ ̅      ̅̅ ̅






There have been different methodologies attempting to accurately measure underperformance of 
new issues. In this section we briefly present some of the most popular methodologies used to 
date along with the reasoning behind our choices. Firstly we present the time horizon and  
However this section is three fold. Before the models for measurement are present in the second 
section, we address the chosen time horizon and matching approaches for the sample returns. The 
third section is devoted to the variables, where the aim is to highlight the model and 
measurements content. 
6.2.1 Time Horizon and Comparable Benchmarks 
 
Prior research has tested the Long Run IPO Performance within a time frame of three to five 
years.   Due to the market size and information constraints of the Nordic markets we decided to 
analyze the underperformance of PE Nordic entities within the first three years of its issuance.  
The data is retrieved and calculated on a monthly basis to increase the number of observation in 
our data set. To reduce the effects of price stabilization on a test sample Ritter (1991) suggests 
removing the first 21-days of trading after the IPO. Additionally we adjust the beginning and 





When measuring the long run underperformance of new issues we found two prevalent 
methodologies in academic literature namely comparable companies and a benchmark index. 
Loughran and Ritter (1995) proposed a model where comparable firms would be matched solely 
based on size. However, other studies have matched firms to other comparable characteristics 
such as market capitalization and book-to-market equity. Fama (1998) contends that the matching 
approach allows to control for cross sectional variation in average returns due to sample 
attributable effects. However, one of the most noted disadvantages of the matching methodology 
is the selection biased. As noted by Norli (2000) the matching sample is limited to those 
companies that have not issued equity in prior years. Furthermore, Draho (2004) states that the 
assumption that matching companies have similar cash flow, risk characteristics and similar 
expected returns is questionable. We fear that this last imperfection to be magnified when our 
sample are traded in four different markets and decide to benchmark our sample against a broader 
index. To capture the Nordics as a whole we decide to use the MSCI Nordic Countries Index 
(MSCI Nordic), which is a common benchmark among financial peers such as Bloomberg and 
Financial Times. In addition we supplement with a self-constructed ad-hoc Nordic Index, which 
will be the underlying index for the Fama-French Three Factor Regression. 
6.2.2 Return calculations 
 
One important aspect of our methodology involves the choice of time regime used to perform the 
return calculations. Financial theory has presented us with two possibilities, the event and 
calendar time approach.  The event time approach consists in calculating returns in a time regime 
that is relative to the entities’ issuance date.  A considerable amount of studies have preferred the 
use of event time approach. However, Brav Gompers (1997) and Gomper and Lerner (2003) have 
shown evidence of a cross-sectional dependence between IPO stocks when using the event time 
approach. Schöber (2008) Contends that a cross-sectional dependence can influence the results of 
return calculations overestimating the t-statistics in an event time regime. The calendar time 
approach on the other hand is able to correct the cross-sectional dependence by tracking the 
performance of a portfolio in calendar time. Fama (1998) contends that the calendar time 
approach is superior to the event regime in that it controls for heteroskedasticity and gives more 




across our time horizon fluctuates due to hot IPO periods we have decided to follow the calendar 
time approach per Fama (1998) and Schöber (2008). 
6.2.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
The Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are 
the two most commonly used methodologies to calculate abnormal stock returns. The BHAR is 
said to be the difference between the IPO sample and the benchmark compounded monthly over 
the time horizon.  Draho (2004) argues that one of the advantages of the BHAR is that it 
incorporates compounding emulating better the investor’s experience. However, he 
acknowledges that compounding creates statistical problems such as extreme skewness and 
inflated abnormal returns. While he argues that these same problems could affect the CAR he 
recognizes that the extent to which results are affected is considerably less. Additionally, the time 
required to adjust abnormal returns is likely to be overstated Fama (1998). The CAR on the other 
hand, while calculating the returns similarly to the BHAR, differs in that it accumulates the 
excess returns throughout the time horizon. Fama (1998) argues that the strengths of the CAR 
model are threefold. Asset pricing models assume normally distributed returns, returns are 
normalized better on a monthly basis rather than yearly and prices adjust sooner after abnormal 
returns. We deem the CAR as the better of the two methodologies and the cumulative abnormal 
returns are measured by the given formula:   
 
                                                   ∑        
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Where,     and      represents return on the entities and a benchmark portfolio respectively. The 
abnormal return     is accumulated in accordance to the entities classification resulting in 
         ,          and            . We elaborate on the weights of the abnormal 
returns on section 6.3.3.1. Note that in calendar time measurements, the accumulation and 
weighting of portfolios’ returns are calculated in actual trading dates.   





Draho (2004) suggests that one of the strongest advantages of the asset pricing model is that it 
offers the possibility of constraining and identifying anomalies in the cross section analysis. 
Moreover, asset pricing models allow researchers to build simple statistics around the model to 
test for abnormal return hypothesis. The asset pricing approach is based on risk pricing 
theoretical background and has three main models; capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama-
French three factor model and the arbitrage pricing theory (APT). In this paper however we focus 
exclusively on the first two as we have found them predominant in financial literature.  
 
The CAPM is founded on the premise that the only relevant risk factor for a firm is its market 
return. The model states that the expected return for stock equals the risk-free interest rate plus 
stock’s beta times the Market Risk Premium Merton (1987). The stock’s abnormal return is 
calculated as the difference between the post-IPO realized return in excess of the free risk rate 
and the net expected return. Hence, when regressing the net realized return on excess of the 
market risk premium we can measure underperformance through the intercept, alpha   . The 
formula is as following, where      represents the return on the sample portfolio,   , the 
estimated Nordic Risk Free Rate and      the return on benchmark index.  
 
              (       ) 
6.2.2.3 Three Factor Regression – Fama-French 
 
Fama and French (1993) tested stock returns using a three factor model that is similar to the 
CAPM, but it includes two additional factors to the equation. As opposed to CAPM, the Fama 
and French model is not an equilibrium relationship and it controls for the size and value effects 
on returns.  
             (       )                
 
As with the Single Factor Regression – CAPM,      represents the return on the sample portfolio, 




additional factors controlling for the size and value effects are the Small Minus Big (SMB) and 
High Minus Low (HML). 
 
    
 
 
                                         
 
 
                       
             
           
 
 
                         
 
 
                           
 
Fama and French had developed a methodology to build the benchmark portfolios using two 
different types of sorting; size and value. In latter versions, size breakpoints are determined by 
the median of the NYSE market equity, while the book-to-market is given by the 30th and 70th 
NYSE percentiles. However, as of 2012 and per their paper “Size, Value, and Momentum in 
International Sock Returns” Fama and French offer a new sorting methodology for size that find 
the breakpoints at the top 90% and the bottom 10% of the market cap respectively. Per Fama 
(1997) the size factor or SMB is the equally weighted average of the returns on three small stock 
portfolios for the region in excess of the average of the returns on three big stock portfolios. The 
HML factor is calculated as the equally weighted average of the returns of the two high book-to-
market portfolios for a region minus the average of the returns for the two low book-to-market 
portfolios. The factors are estimated from the ad-hoc Nordic Index. 
6.3 The Variables 
6.3.1 The Benchmarks 
 
The MSCI Nordic and the ad-hoc Nordic Index are set as comparable benchmarks to our sample 
portfolios. The returns are calculated as following, where,      represents the value of the 
underlying benchmark:  
     
           
    
⁄  
As it will be discuss in detail further, the underlying values between MSCI Nordic and Nordic 




obtained directly. However the Nordic index is retrieved as Market Value in order to obtain the 
consistency when estimating the Fama-French Factors. The     is the accumulated MV for the 
underlying entities which make up the index.  
6.3.2 The Risk Free Rate 
 
The Nordic region, excluding Iceland, consists of four individual markets resulting in a variety of  
risk free rates     . Since there is no common free risk rate for the region we construct a free risk 
rate that is weighted to the benchmark index.  The weights are then accumulated MV by country 
  ∑       
 
     in respect to the total MV of the Nordic Index (  ∑      
 
    , by monthly periods.  
                     ,where        
∑      
 
   
∑     
 
   
⁄  
6.3.3  The Sample Portfolios 
Monthly returns for each portfolio are calculated in accordance to the underlying data of its 
benchmark index. The value in the end of the period      , either in RI or MV, is subtracted and 
divided by the period starting value    .      
     
           
    
⁄              ∑       
 
    
The BO and VC portfolio are created by separating the entities according to its classification and 
accumulating the product of the IPO samples weighted return.   
6.3.3.1 Return-weighting  
 
An important part of calculating returns involves choosing the weighting methodologies; equally 
or value (market capitalization) weighted returns. Ritter (1995) has shown evidence proving that 
the choice of weights in the sample portfolios could affects the results. Loughran and Ritter (2002) 
demonstrate that the equally weighted approach underestimates by half the abnormal return of 
small firms during hot IPO periods compared to market weighted returns. However, Brav, Gezcy 
and Gompers (2000) make the case that each methodology has strengths depending on the scope 




when trying to quantify investors’ average wealth post IPO. Conversely, equally-weighting 
captures more accurately mis-pricing ex ante IPO while detecting managerial timing with more 
precision. Both methods have their strengths and weaknesses. To measure the performance with 
and without regards the entities relative size, the portfolios are weighted with respect to both 
methodologies. The BO and VC sample portfolios and the CAR calculations are weighted in 
accordance to the following formulas.  
Equally Weighted:       ⁄     ,where n is number of samples in portfolio. 
 
Value Weighted:              ∑      
 
       ,where the value weighting are based on the 






















7 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
 
There is no uniform approach on sample identification and classification methodologies among 
scholars. In this chapter we briefly discuss commonly used methodologies along with a 
description of the selection criteria and resources used for the Nordic BO and VC sample 
identification.  
7.1 Sample Identification 
 
When creating our data set we first determined a time horizon that would deem relevant to our 
analysis. In order to capture a significant sample for our tests we set a ten year time horizon that 
extends from 1998 to 2008. The data set extends three years after our time horizon until January 
2012 in order to study the performance of companies issued in 2008. Since our study focuses 
exclusively on the performance of VC and BO we researched existing methodologies of BO and 
VC classification. Schöber (2008) acknowledges the challenges involved in the classification of 
PE entities partially because of the fragmented information available but also because of the 
different stages of investment that entities can undergo. Muscarella and Vestsuypens (1989), 
Kaplan (1991), Gertner and Kaplan (1996), Chou (2001), Cao and Lerner (2006) performed the 
classification through industry publications, financial newspapers, IPO prospectuses and other 
financial databases. However, scholars warn of the limitations of online databases and the 
dangers of not cross-referencing with alternative sources. As a prima facie approach we decided 
to analyze the classification of VC and BO offered by Bureau Van Dijk, Zephyr and Orbis 
databases. The search query identified 93 PE backed companies. After an initial screening we 
noted that the classification was inconsistent and inaccurate and hence we decided to construct 
our list from alternative sources.  
 
We form our first search criteria for identifying our sample objects:  
 
 I)  The entity completed an Initial Public Offering in the time period of 1998-2008. 
  





 III) The entity has received sponsoring from a Private Equity firm which is a member of 
either of the Danish, Finnish, Norwegian or Swedish Venture Capital association. 
 
After a thorough research we obtained an initial list of issuances within our time horizon from the 
Danish, Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish stock exchanges, including the exchanges for smaller 
companies such as Oslo Axess and the First North`s. The IPO`s are cross checked against 
investment exits from the Nordic Venture Capital Association`s (N-VCA) members list 
containing 251 PE firms and the Argentum Online Database. The cross checking is performed 
through PE websites and PE professionals (see appendix). We identified 134 entities which have 
received funding from 45 of the 251 members of Venture Capital association. We find that 
certain PE firms are behind the majority of exits by IPO with the following distribution of the 
nine most active: NorgesInvestor AS (10), NorthZone (6), Norvestor with Norsk Vekst ASA (6), 
HealthCap AB (5), Convexa Capital (4), EQT (4), Verdane Capital Advisor (4), Capman (3) and 
IK Investment Partners (3). 
7.2  Buyout and Venture Capital Classification 
 
To determine the selection criteria between the BO and VC portfolios we bundle Leverage 
Buyouts (LBO), Management Buyouts (MBO) and “Other Non-VC” into one Buyout category 
following Schöber’s (2008) methodology. The “Other Non- VC” category consists of capital 
from financial sponsors that target fund recapitalization, acquisitions and investment in “New 
Non-VC type Companies”. This means that our BO portfolio should consist of entities which 
have received support from a wide-range of BO type entities. Our VC backed portfolio should 
then consist of entities which clearly have received sponsoring from classic VC firms 
 
As an implicit effect of the financial sponsor’s differences in investment strategies, we would 
expect to find quantitative variances in terms of growth rates, equity stake hold and target’s age. 
The differences between Buyout and Venture capital strategies are not mutually exclusive in 
terms of quantifiable characteristics. Additionally, during a conference call with Staale Myrstad, 
Partner in NorgesInvestor Management AS, further limitations were revealed. It is said to be a 
common practice for Nordic PE firms to invest through holding companies. The holding 




leverage by debt, hence a LBO deal. This practice implies that LBO transactions are less likely to 
be revealed through its financial statement. To reduce possible biases to our sample, we resort to 
a qualitative approach. We based our primary source of information on phone interviews and 
email correspondence with key personnel in the PE Nordic Industry. As a secondary source we 
rely on information obtained through PE websites, financial news articles, IPO’s prospectuses 
and other market sources. Additionally, we utilized Argentums database of PE entities to further 
verify our classification. 
 
To ensure the validity of our sample portfolios we rigorously fulfilled criteria number two, where 
the transactions are to take place prior to the IPO. When missing information regarding 
investment entry and exit we excluded the entities classified as BO. The sample size is presented 
below showing the distribution of BO and VC across the countries in the Nordic region. 
 
 
7.3 Data Collection Underpricing 
 
In order to measure underpricing two major components are required, namely closing and 
offering price. To obtain the offering prices and closing prices of the Norwegian firms we used 
the Oslo Børs website. Similarly, we were able to obtain the data for the Danish sample from the 
Nasdaq OMX website. However, the information available for the rest of the region was 
considerably more scattered. In the case of the Swedish sample Ulf Persson, Economic and 
Statistical researcher for the Nasdaq OMX Stockholm provided us with the IPO offering prices 
for our sample. Joha Manu, market surveyor of the Nasdaq OMX Helsinki, confirmed that the 
offering prices data was unavailable for the Finnish market. Jessica Gutierrez senior finance 
officer from Bank of America Merrill Lynch through Bloomberg was able to provide us with a 
great portion of the missing offering prices. In case of the closing prices we resorted to the 

























Datastream. After adjusting our sample for missing offering or closing prices the sample size 
distribution is as follows. 
 
 
7.4 Data Collection Underperformance 
 
Thomson Reuters Financial Datastream (Datastream) was a valuable resource to obtain the data 
required to perform the underperformance calculations. As explained in the methodology section 
post IPO performance is tested though the CAR, the single factor regression and the Fama-French 
three factor regression model. The tests require entity stock data, a risk free rate, a benchmark 
index and its corresponding SMB and HML Fama-French Factors. The data behind the SMB and 
HML factors consist of Size, Book to Market and Returns for the entities in a benchmark index.  
In the absence of existing SMB and HML factors for the Nordic markets we constructed our own.  
 
 We considered the MSCI Nordic as a representative index for our data set. However due to 
disclosing policies we could not gain access to the composition of the index. Therefore, we were 
unable to use the MSCI index to perform the Fama-French model. We utilized instead our  
 self-constructed ad-hoc Nordic Index. The Nordic Index is constructed through 1931 entities 
actively traded in our selected time horizon. To maintain consistency between the size and returns 
of the factor calculations, the index is calculated through the Market Value (MV) of the entities. 
Datastream does not provide the MV for the MSCI Nordic, the data is obtained as Total Return 
Index (RI). The MV is the product of the Price-adjusted (P) and the number of shares (NOSH). P 
adjusts for subsequent capital actions and NOSH is updated whenever new tranches of stock are 
issued, or in case of other capital changes. The RI is equal to Price Index (PI), plus dividends 
being reinvested, where PI is a product of NOAH and Price Unadjusted (UP). The content of the 
two data types should be similar, however, when compared slight differences occur. To assure 
















The BO and VC portfolio returns are calculated by RI and MV for the MSCI Nordic and ad-hoc 
Nordic Index, respectively. 
 
One of the particular characteristics of our sample is that it is composed of four different 
countries with five different currencies. To control for currency exposure the MV and RI are 
obtained in US Dollars. 
 
The estimated Nordic Risk Free Rate (RF) is the product of the individual countries 10 year 
Government bonds and the accumulated MV for each country divided by the ad-hoc Nordic 
Index total MV.  
 
The stock data is obtained in monthly periods and values are given by the first day of the month. 
For newly listed companies the data is not noted until the first month after the IPO. To follow 
Ritter`s methodology the first data point is eliminated. In the other end of the time horizon stock 
data after 36 months of trading is removed. A cross check of IPO dates indicate variety between 




While the sample selection period stretched from the 1st of January 1998 until the 1st of January 
2012, the first and last IPO were noted on the 4th of April 1998 to the 14th of November 2007. 
After removing the first month of trading, adjusting the end periods to control for less than two 
observations per period and assuring symmetry between the BO and VC portfolios, the final time 
series extends from September 1st 1998 through September 1st 2010. The sample is constituted by 
145 observations and for any given point in time the number of active companies in each 
portfolio varies from 3 to 17 and 2 to 28 for BO and VC respectively. From the portfolio sample 
size distribution displayed beneath in table 5, we note the sample size to peak in 2001and first 




















































In this chapter we introduce the results from the various underpricing and underperformance 
measurements in addition to a brief interpretation of our findings. A summary of the outputs is 
shown in Panel 1 to 5, while the original outputs are included in the appendix. The results are 
further elaborated in the discussion section.  
8.1 Underpricing 
 
In order to test the null hypothesis we study the mean differences between the two PE entities. 
We achieve this by performing a two tailed independent t-test that includes BOs and VCs first 
day returns.  As shown in Panel 2 we can see that the means of the BO and VC sample are in 
accordance with Hypothesis 1. Buyout firms have a mean first day return of 8,4% while VC 
backed entities show a -1,1%, suggesting  underpricing and overpricing for BO and VC 
respectively. The mean difference shows that BO backed entities have a 9.5% higher returns than 
VC backed firms. However, both the t and the p value of our sample are considerably low. Hence, 
at a confidence level of 95% we are not able to reject the null hypothesis. Nevertheless, we found 
that our results could be considered slightly significant when looking at a .80% confidence level.  
 
 
Panel 2: Results Underpricing of Buyout and Venture Capital Sponsored Entities  
8.2 Underperformance 
 
The performance is measured as the CAR in calendar time using the single factor regression 
(CAPM) and the Fama-French three factor regression Fama-French (2012). The results are 
presented in monthly periods through Panel 3a, 4a and 5a respectively. Panel b illustrates the 
results when estimated over longer time periods to offer a broader scope of our findings.  
Buyout Venture Capital
Mean 0,0838 -0,0107















8.2.1 The Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 
In order to test our second hypothesis we verify the mean differences between the returns on BO 
and VC to determine whether we can reject the null hypothesis. To achieve this we perform four 
independent t-test that compare returns of BOs and VCs divided in four different categories: 
equally weighted, value weighted and using the MSCI index and our ad-hoc Nordic Index.  As 
shown in Panel 3a the t-values of the four t-tests are not significant at a 95% confidence level. 
This is further confirmed when looking at the two tailed significance level of the four t-test (see 
appendix).  However, the mean difference suggests that VC backed entities tends to outperform 
the BO backed firms in terms of cumulative abnormal return. When benchmarked to the ad-hoc 
Nordic Index, the weighting seems to have less effect on the outcome, relative to the MSCI 
Nordic Benchmark. The monthly mean difference is approximately -1.3%(monthly) or - 
14,5%(yearly), but could be deemed slightly lower as the MSCI Nordic test indicates -  
1.0%(monthly)/-30,4%(yearly) and -0.8%(monthly)/-25,1%(yearly), for the Equal (EW) and 




Panel 3a: Results Cumulative Abnormal Return – Calendar time 
 
Panel 3b: Results Cumulative Abnormal Return – Calendar time – Estimated Return over time 
Benchmark:
BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Mean 0,004 0,017 -0,005 0,008 0,016 0,027 0,014 0,023
Std. Deviation 0,11 0,12 0,09 0,12 0,18 0,19 0,20 0,21
Independent T-test:
Mean Difference -0,013 -0,013 -0,010 -0,008
(t-value) (-0,99) (-1,09) (-0,48) (-0,35)
Nordic Index MSCI Nordic
Equally Weighted Value Weighted Equally Weighted Value Weighted
Benchmark:
Time period: BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Montly (n=1) 0,40 % 1,70 % -1,30 % -0,50 % 0,80 % -1,30 % 1,60 % 2,70 % -1,00 % 1,40 % 2,30 % -0,80 %
Yearly (n=12) 4,91 % 22,42 % -14,53 % -5,84 % 10,03 % -14,53 % 20,98 % 37,67 % -11,36 % 18,16 % 31,37 % -9,19 %
3 Years (n=36) 15,46 % 83,47 % -37,57 % -16,51 % 33,22 % -37,57 % 77,08 % 160,94 % -30,36 % 64,96 % 126,74 % -25,11 %
Nordic Index MSCI Nordic




To offer a broader scope to our results we present the returns on a monthly, yearly and 3 year 
time horizon.  The returns are calculated as           
   , where n is number of monthly 
periods in    . 
8.2.2 Single Factor Regression – CAPM 
 
Performance is measured by regressing the equally and value weighted BO, VC and BO in excess 
of VC portfolios to the RMRF factor. The RMRF is the market risk premium, as the excess return 
on MSCI Nordic or our ad-hoc Nordic Index (RM), subtracted by the estimated Nordic Risk Free 
Rate (RF). The RMRF parameter, Beta   , adjusts for the systematic risk relative to the market 
security line (SML) Jensen (1967). As shown in Panel 4a the RMRF factors are significantly 
different from zero for all BO and VC portfolio regressions given their low p-values. The BO`s 
tend to adjust for a greater portion of the systematic risk and have higher fluctuations to the SML 
than of the VC counterpart, given the overall higher beta`s. The portfolios Beta seems to be 
affected by size as we get mix results between the Equal (EW) and Value weighting (VW). The 
Beta for VC are below or close to 1 when equally weighted and 1,1 or above when value 
weighted. The BO Beta are close to or above 1 in all regressions and reach  a high of 1,3, when 
value weighted portfolios are regressed toward the Nordic Index. 
The Intercepts in the regression represents the abnormal return, alpha   , between the underlying 
portfolio and its benchmark index. The p-values are high in all tests and exceed both a 5% 
statistical alpha. Hence we cannot reject the null hypothesis and the intercepts are not 
significantly different from zero. The BO in excess of VC (BO-VC) maintains a steady intercept 
of -1,3% (monthly)/-14,1% (yearly) across all regression, both for EW and VW portfolios and 
regressed to both benchmarks. However, the results fluctuate more when the portfolios are 
analyzed individually. The BO can be said to show negative abnormal returns, where it 
underperforms compared to the benchmark indexes in three of the four regressions. In the lower 
end of the results, BO underperform with -0,8%(monthly)/-9,9%(yearly) and at its best it over 
perform by 0,4% (monthly)/4,8% (yearly) when EW in Nordic Index . The BO`s have smaller 
fluctuations between the extremes than the VC`s. While all of the VC`s intercepts are positive the 




1,6%(monthly)/79,5%(yearly). The intercepts fluctuates the most between the indexes, when 
portfolios are equally weighted.  
The explanations of the variables are relatively poor for all of the single factor regressions. The 
Value weighted BO portfolio, holds the highest explanation with an R-squared of 0,62. However, 
similar degrees of explanations where found in the work of Gompers and Lerner (2003), while 
exploring the Post IPO long-run performance in the US.  
    
 
Panel 4a: Results Single Factor Regression – CAPM 
 
Panel 4b: Results Single Factor Regression – CAPM – Estimated over time 
8.2.3 Three Factor Regression - Fama-French 
 
In addition to the Market Risk Premium (RMRF), the portfolio returns are regressed to the SMB 
and HML factors, adjusting the performance for size and value premiums. Our finding show 
strong similarities in terms of RMRF and R-squared for both indexes while their intercepts are 
dissimilar. In both weight measurements the BO and VC portfolios shows a reduction in their 
abnormal return. However, the VC`s consistently over perform relative to the benchmark index, 
where the performance for BO is dependent on the weighting. In the three factor regression, the 
difference between the BO and VC are reduced in both EV and VW weighted. The BO-VC 
decreases to -0,6% (monthly)/-19,8% (yearly) and -0,98% (monthly)/-29,8% (yearly), for EW 
Benchmark:
BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Intercept 0,004 0,016 -0,012 -0,007 0,006 -0,013 -0,005 0,007 -0,013 -0,009 0,001 -0,013
(P-Value) (0,65) (0,12) (0,32) (0,29) (0,52) (0,21) (0,34) (0,49) (0,30) (-0,02) (-0,02) (0,21)
RMRF 1,076 1,028 0,047 1,339 1,258 0,081 1,006 0,892 0,088 1,219 1,138 0,077
(P-Value) (0,00) (0,00) (0,673) (0,00) (0,00) (0,55) (0,00) (0,00) (0,42) (0,96) (0,91) (0,58)
R-squared 0,39 0,29 0,00 0,62 0,42 0,00 0,60 0,26 0,00 0,58 0,39 0,00
Nordic Index MSCI Nordic
Equally Weighted Value Weighted Equally Weighted Value Weighted
Benchmark:
Time period: BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Montly (n=1) 0,39 % 1,64 % -1,25 % -0,68 % 0,63 % -1,31 % -0,53 % 0,72 % -1,28 % -0,86 % 0,09 % -1,32 %
Yearly (n=12) 4,78 % 21,53 % -14,00 % -7,86 % 7,79 % -14,68 % -6,22 % 8,99 % -14,34 % -9,87 % 1,14 % -14,73 %
3 Years (n=36) 15,04 % 79,48 % -36,40 % -21,77 % 25,25 % -37,90 % -17,52 % 29,46 % -37,15 % -26,78 % 3,45 % -37,99 %
Nordic Index MSCI Nordic




and VW respectively. When portfolios are value weighted the BO-VC are unaffected compared 
to previous results. The p-values are similar to the single factor regression, confirming no 
significance among the results.  
The interpretation of the Fama-French (2012), display interesting results, especially for the VC 
portfolios. When equally weighted both the SMB and HML factors are significantly different 
from zero as the p-values are lower than the 5% statistical alpha. Further will all portfolios, BO 
and VC, hold positive SMB and negative HML values, again similar to the work of Gompers and 
Lerner (2003). However the VC-EW holds the greatest values with 0,59 (SMB) and -0,39 (HML), 
both significant. The SMB loadings, which are remarkably lower than one, could imply the 
sample returns to be les explained by the size factor. While HML factor implies that companies 
with High B/M show higher returns than those of Low B/M, the negative loadings in the VC 
sample implies an inverse relationship.  Companies with a lower B/M, as high market value 
relative to book value, have performed better than its counterparts.  
 
Panel 5a: Results Three Factor Regression – Fama-French (2012) 
 
 
Panel 5b: Results Three Factor Regression – Fama-French (2012) - Estimated over time 
Benchmark:
BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Intercept 0,003 0,009 -0,006 -0,007 0,002 -0,010
(P-Value) (0,76) (0,38) (0,62) (0,25) (0,79) (0,35)
RMRF 1,087 1,162 -0,075 1,359 1,132 0,040
(P-Value) (0,00) (0,00) (0,53) (0,00) (0,00) (0,80)
SMB 0,048 0,599 -0,551 0,098 0,267 -0,169
(P-Value) (0,71) (0,01) (0,02) (0,41) (0,08) (0,34)
HML -0,032 -0,399 0,367 -0,065 -0,178 0,113
(P-Value) (0,71) (0,01) (0,02) (0,41) (0,08) (0,34)
R-squared 0,39 0,34 0,02 0,62 0,43 0,02
Nordic Index
Equally Weighted Value Weighted
Benchmark:
Time period: BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
Montly (n=1) 0,30 % 0,91 % -0,62 % -0,73 % 0,25 % -0,98 %
Yearly (n=12) 3,72 % 11,51 % -7,14 % -8,41 % 2,99 % -11,17 %
3 Years (n=36) 11,57 % 38,65 % -19,92 % -23,16 % 9,23 % -29,92 %
Nordic Index




9 Results Discussion 
In this chapter we interpret our results and its implications towards our hypothesis. Additionally, 
we relate our findings to existing financial, economic theory and empirical evidence.    
9.1 Underpricing 
 
In accordance to information asymmetry theory empirical evidence has shown the existence of 
underpricing of new issuances Ibbotson (1975), Reilly (1977), Ritter (1984). However, we have 
contended in this thesis the possibility of ameliorating information asymmetry through 
certification. There is empirical evidence of certification through association ex-ante IPO. 
Gompers (1997) had suggested the possibility of ameliorating information asymmetry through PE 
backing. Hadryd, Mietzner and Shciereck (2010) show differences in the levels of 
underperformance and underpricing among different PE entities suggesting different levels of 
certification. 
 
We have found, through a two tailed independent t-test, to have no significant mean differences 
at the 95% confidence level in first day returns of BO and VC entities. Despite the size of the 
sample we found a slight significance at the 80% confidence level. When looking at the mean of 
the two samples, however, we found that the results are not in accordance with our H1 hypothesis. 
VC present negative average returns close to 1% suggesting that these entities had been 
overpriced. Buyouts on the other hand show an underperformance of 8%. 
 
Empirical evidence has shown that underpricing among BO entities is considerably lower 
compared to non-BO backed entities Hogan Olson and Kish (2001), Ang and Brau (2002), 
Browman and Graves (2005). The BO underpricing has been shown to average between 2.0% 
and 7.6%. These figures are considerably lower to the 18.6% figure published by Ritter (2011) 
for international IPOs. Our study is in accordance with these findings showing an initial BO 
underpricing of 8%.  Consistent with Booth and Smith (1986), Megginson and Weiss (1991), 
Olson and Kish (2001) and Schöber (2008) our findings suggest that BO backed entities do 
ameliorate the information asymmetry between the issuer and the market.   
 
Barry (1990) found that a VCs reputation had an inverse relationship with respect to the issuers 




the issuer would leave. This goes in line with information asymmetry and certification theories. 
In our study we have found not only that VCs are not underpriced but that they show slight 
overpricing. Following information asymmetry theory our work suggests that the information 
asymmetry gap between underwriters and the market has reduced enough for the market to judge 
the underwriter’s valuation more critically. In other words investors could be exerting downward 
pressure on the offering price lowering the offering price.  While a negative first day return is not 
a desirable outcome for the underwriter and both the institutional and market investors, for the 
issuer it means that there was no money left on the table. This is consistent with Barry’s findings 
regarding the power of a VC sponsor in reducing underpricing.  However, while the information 
asymmetry could have been reduced from an investor perspective the underwriter could still be 
considerably uncertain about the market’s demand of the new issue. Our results could suggest 
that the underwriters could potentially be overestimating the markets appetite for the new issue. 
Alternatively, the overpricing could be interpreted as an investors’ premium to the issuer to 
incentivize its growth. 
 
 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) empirical evidence of VC certification shows that PE backed 
company exercise a signaling influence on the market. Through information asymmetry and 
certification theory we have contended that BO and VC have different degrees of certification. 
We have based these views on Jensen (1989) and Sørensen (2007) concepts of value adding value 
mechanisms of BOs and VCs. Browman and Graves (2005) and Barry (1990) show that BO and 
VC have significantly less underpricing than on PE backed companies. Our findings are in line 
with Browman and Graves (2005) and Barry (1990) empirical evidence. Furthermore, our 




Underperformance has been extensively documented in finance literature in the past two decades 
Ritter (1991), Loughran (1994), Loughran, Ritter (1995, 1997), Schultz (2003).  Levis (2008) and 
Cao (2011) have recently looked at the effects of PE sponsoring in underperformance. Their work 
has suggested the possibility that PE backing can reduce the long term underperformance in new 




homogeneous. While Schöber (2008) found that buyouts underperform in the long run, Levis 
(2008) shows evidence of over-performance for venture capital entities. We contend that these 
differences could be attributed to differences in levels of certification explained through their 
specific value adding mechanisms.  
 
By studying the mean differences between the cumulative abnormal returns of BOs and VCs, we 
found that at a 95% confidence level we were unable to reject the null hypothesis. The p-values 
from the regression models indicate similar results, where the abnormal returns are not 
significantly different from zero. However, we are able to draw valuable observations and find 
that VC backed entities outperform the BO`s by approximately 1.3% (montly) / 14% (yearly) for 
both the CAR and Single Factor Regression. The over performance is reduced in the three factor 
regression, where the VC portfolio displays significant influence from the SMB and HML factors. 
These results relates to empirical evidence, as Schöber (2008) found the BOs to underperform the 
market throughout a three year time horizon. Similarly, our work reflects Levis (2008) findings 
showing VC backed entities over performing the market.  
 
Schöber (2008) had shown that leveraged buyouts had better long term stock performance 
compared to other buyout firms. He attributed this difference in performance to the superior 
information available to investors from the issuer’s prior public information. This theory could be 
validated in the first year cumulative returns as the buyouts are able to over perform the index. 
However, when looking at his results for 3 to 5 year returns buyouts are considerably 
underperforming against the market. This suggests that the information asymmetry theory could 
only explain short term adjustments between underwriter and market valuations. In line with 
Schöber results our findings suggest that in a three year time horizon BO backed entities will 
underperform the market. This could show that factors outside information asymmetry theory 
could better explain the long run underperformance of BO firms. We have made the case in this 
thesis that the value adding mechanisms of sponsors are responsible for the underperformance of 
BO firms.    
 
Our results are similar to those obtained by Levis (2008) showing over performance of the VC 




the ability of VC companies to create value. If we take into consideration the underpricing and 
underperformance results of the VC we can see a clearer picture of the Nordic markets feelings 
towards BOs. Despite a growing market for VC backed firms, it seems that investors are weary of 
the potential performance of VC issues. However, as the price stabilizes VC backed entities seem 
to be able to attract investors. This could be explained through strong cash flows performance of 
the new issues.  Alternatively, we could explain these results through industry market specific 
characteristics such as industry concentration.  
 
Jensen (1989) and Sørensen (2007) had shown the differences in value adding mechanisms 
between BOs and VCs respectively.  While cash flows are not an essential value adding 
mechanisms for BOs, VCs are more sensitive to them. Brau and Fawcett (2006) had shown 
evidence that markets regard cash flows as the strongest signal of quality of an issuer. 
Concordantly, we have contended that the industry value adding characteristics of buyout 
companies would limit the projected growth of the company effectively limiting the certification 
effect of the sponsors over the issuer. Our results show that in accordance to this reasoning BO 
backed entities have underperformed compared to VC backed. While our results are not 
statistically significant they shed light on the market’s perception of value between these two PE 












10.1 Selection Bias 
 
The main selection biases are originated when identifying entities for our sample and collection 
their respective data. The sample findings are to a great extent obtained by the Nordic members 
of the Venture Capital Associations per January 2012. This selection methodology can generate 
two biases. The first bias is in regards to PE firms being represented for the screening process. By 
solely relying on the “N-VCA” members list per January 2012 we lack information from the 
firms who have proceeded with an IPO in Nordic market, but are non-members for this given 
date. The prospects could be international firms, delisted PE firms or other non-members. 
However, when we find international firms such as 3i and KKR in our PE firm sample the 
magnitude of this fault might be minor. In contrary can the lack of information from delisted 
members could raise red flags. In our market research we come across only one delisted PE firm, 
Norsk Vekst ASA. In this case their funds were transferred to Norvestor, who backs a significant 
portion of our end IPO sample. The second bias relates to the PE firms transparency toward their 
exited investments. If a PE Firms reduce transparency toward exit with poor post IPO 
performance, our results can be conceived as overstated. 
 
The sample portfolios offering price, closing price and stock data are collected from various 
sources. For the first two mentioned the stock exchanges have been our primary source of 
information, while supplemented with Datastream and Bloomberg. When comparing the data 
sources we find small signs of variances, which could imply minor inconsistencies to the input in 
the underpricing analysis. The inconsistency in long run performance should be slim as all stock 
data is obtained from Datastream. Certain stock exchanges do not hold information for delisted 
entities, and stock data for entities subject to mergers or acquisitions are missing. This is clearly 
imposing a survival bias to our sample, both in the Underpricing and Underperformance analysis.   
10.2 Methodology 
 





Due to the limitations of our sample we were not able to further inspect additional factors that 
would shed more light on the different levels of certification between buyouts and venture capital 
backed companies. Regressing the reputation of a sponsor to the returns of the issuer could have 
given us more evidence to judge the certification effect in underpricing. Furthermore, controlling 
for industry concentration, size and book to market could had provided more clarity in the actual 
effect of certification.  
We acknowledge that using an asset pricing model to measure underperformance has a number of 
limitations. As noted by Draho (2004) the power of the Fama French model to detect 
underperformance is low. Brav and Gompers (1997) contend that companies with low book to 
market ratios tend to have negative intercepts indistinctive of new stock issuance. Hence, the 
model is biased to find underperformance. Additionally, further analysis of companies cash flows 
and other operative performance benchmarks could have shed more light on the impact of value 
adding mechanisms in Due to the limitations of our sample we were not able to further inspect 
additional factors that would shed more light on the different levels of certification between 
buyouts and venture capital backed companies. Regressing the reputation of a sponsor to the 
returns of the issuer could have given us more evidence to judge the certification effect in 
underpricing. Furthermore, controlling for industry concentration, size and book to market could 












11    Conclusion 
 
This study has tested the Nordic markets to look for differences in underpricing and 
underperformance of new issues among two specific classes of IPOs, BO and VC backed firms..  
We have found that in line with previous empirical evidence buyout and venture capital backed 
entities have different levels of certification. Using independent two tailed t tests and regression 
analysis our results show that in average venture capital backed firms are overpriced by 1 % 
while buyout backed firm are underpriced by 8%. In the long run venture capital firms 
outperform buyout firms by an average of 1.3% per month. While the long run results are in line 
with prior research the underpricing finding contradict earlier research. These results are 
interesting as they suggest that VC backed firms in the Nordic could potentially have different 
strategies that favor early stage entities. Moreover, it poses interesting questions about the 
characteristics of the Venture Capital firms in the Nordic equity markets, their ability to certify 
and the priority they have on their investments.  
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delisting Classification Source PE Funding Source Classification
1 24SEVENOFFICE ASA NO Axess Agder Energi Venture 22.06.2007 VC www.aeventure.no www.aeventure.no
2 Ability Group ASA NO SMB Altor Equity Partners Altor 2003 2004 03.07.2006 BO
Jesper Eliasson, Altor Private 
Equity
SVCA.se
3 Aerocrine AB SE OMX Main HealthCap
(1. Investor Growth Capital) 
(2. CapMan Life Science IV) 
(3. Swedestart Life Science)




4 Affectogenimap Oyj FI MAIN LIST
Fenno Management, CapMan 
and Eqvitec
01.06.2005 VC
Jonne Kuittinen, FVCA   +  
business.highbeam.com
Jonne Kuittinen, FVCA
5 Akva Group ASA NO SMB Teknoinvest Management AS 10.11.2006 VC www.newsweb.no www.teknoinvest.no
6 Aldata Solution Oyj FI MAIN LIST Capman
Fenno Rahasto  Finnventure 
Rahasto I, II & III
1997 2001 27.10.1999 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
7 Alfa Laval AB SE O-list IK Investment Partners IK 2000 2000 2005 17.05.2002 BO
www.ikinvest.com    + 
Argentum.no
Argentum.no
8 Algeta ASA NO - NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor III 2003 2009 27.03.2007 VC www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
9 APL ASA NO SMB
Hitecvision   +  
Energyventures
Energy Ventures I 18.03.2005 14.06.2007 VC
Lisbeth M. Iversen, 
Economist ,Menon 
Argentum.no
10 Apptix ASA NO SMB Convexa Convexa Capital IV AS 08.04.2002 VC www.convexa.no Argentum.no
11 A-Rakennusmies Oyj FI MAIN LIST MB Funds + Capman 1995 1998 30.04.1998 MBO
Andreas Rokne, Capman + 
www.mbfunds.fi
Andreas Rokne, Capman
12 Aresa (Aqualife) DK First North
ApS Falkenhøj - Ole 
Andersen
VF Venture (Vækstkapital) 14.02.2006 VC falkenhoj.dk Argentum.no
13 Artema Medical AB SE O-list Affärsstrategerna AB  Affarsstrategerna Fund(s) 1990 2001 04.05.1999 14.12.2001 VC
www.astrateg.se  + 
Argentum.no
Claes-Göran Fridh, 
Affärsstrategerna AB  
14 Axxessit NO SMB
Convexa Capital  + 
Norgeinvestor
04.06.2004 07.09.2005 MBO www.convexa.no IPO Prospectus
15 Badger explorer ASA NO Main Convexa Capital Convexa Capital IV AS 2005 12.06.2007 VC www.convexa.no Argentum.no
16 Ballingslöv AB SE O-list EQT EQT 1 1998 2002 19.06.2002 12.12.2008 BO
www.eqt.se    + 
Argentum.no
Argentum.no
17 BE Group AB SE - Nordic Capital + Traction
Nordic Capital Fund III, IV & 
V
1999 2006 24.11.2006 BO
Argentum   +   
www.nordiccapital.com
Argentum.no
18 BioGaia Biologics AB SE O-list Centrecourt AB 28.05.1998 VC www.centrecourt.se SVCA.se
19 BioInvent International AB SE O-list
AB Chalmersinvest  + 
Innovations kapital 
 (Industrifonden) 2010 12.06.2001 VC www.innkap.se SVCA.se   + Argentum.no




21 Biotec Pharmacon ASA NO SMB Norgesinvestor + Verdane Norgesinvestor 1997 2005 04.11.2005 VC www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
22 Birdstep Technology ASA NO SMB POD investment  Finnventure Rahasto V 2000 2009 12.06.2002 BO www.podinvestment.se
Argentum.no  + 
www.priveq.se
23 Bjørge ASA NO SMB Norvestor 1997 2005 17.12.2004 14.12.2010 CM www.norvestor.no Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
24 C Technologies AB SE O-list Centrecourt 15.06.2000 VC www.centrecourt.se SVCA.se
25 Cermaq ASA NO Main List NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor II 1999 2005 24.10.2005 BO Argentum.no Argentum.no
26 CityMail Sweden AB SE O-list Procuritas
Procuritas Capital Partners II 
(PCP II)
1997 1998 01.07.1998 23.01.2006 BO www.procuritas.se www.procuritas.se




28 Consorte Group NO SMB
Norgesinvestor + Herkules 
capital + Norvestor
Norgesinvestor 2, Herkules 
Private Equity Fund III
1999 2006 13.06.2001 30.12.2008 VC www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
29 Customax NO SMB Norgesinvestor Norgesinvestor 1997 2000 19.06.2000 22.06.2001 VC www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor




31 Duni AB SE OMX Main EQT Partners EQT I & III 1997 2008 14.11.2007 BO www.eqt.se + Argentum.no Argentum.no
32 Ellen AB  SE First North Verdane Verdane Capital V K/S 2006 2007 30.08.2007 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
33 Endomines AB SE First North
Teknoventure Management 
Oy + Suomen 
Teollisuussijoitus Oy
2003 2007 19.06.2007 VC www.noweco.fi
Mauri Visuri, Teknoventure 
Management
34 Enlight International AB SE First North Litorina Litorina Fund I & II 2002 2006 08.09.2005 VC
Argentum.no   +  
www.litorina.se
Argentum.no
35 Exel Oyj FI Sponsor Capital 1997 2000 02.05.2000 LBO www.sponsor.fi
Marit Suominen, Sponsor 
Capital
36 Exiqon A/S DK Main- DK
Scandinavian Life Science 
Venture
Scandinavian Life Science 
Venture       Bio Fund 
Ventures I        Teknoinvest 
VIII KS
2000 2008 29.05.2007 VC www.slsinvest.com
Argentum.no + 
www.unquote.com
37 Expert Eilag NO Main Norgesinvestor Norgesinvestor 1997 2003 14.04.2000 23.10.2007 BO www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
38 Fingerprint Cards AB SE O-list Affärsstrategerna AB Affarsstrategerna Fund(s) 1997 2003 23.06.1998 VC www.astrateg.se
Claes-Göran Fridh, 
Affärsstrategerna AB  
39 Funcom NO SMB
Northzone Ventures , Nordic 
Venture Partners
NVP II     Northzone IV K/S 2004 2008 13.12.2005 VC
Stine Foss, Northzone  + 
Argentum.no   + 
www.nordic.com
Argentum.no
40 Gant Company AB SE O-list 3i 2003 28.03.2006 20.03.2008 BO www.3i.com SVCA.se   + Argentum.no
41 Generic AB SE First North industrifonden 17.11.2008 VC www.industrifonden.se www.industrifonden.se
42 Genmab DK Mainmarket DKNB Capital + Apax NB Capital 18.10.2000 VC www.nbcapital.net
Argentum.no + 
www.nbcapital.net
43 Global IP Solutions NO Main Kistefos Venture Capital Kistefos Venture Capital 1999 2010 22.07.2008 26.08.2010 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
44 Grenland Group NO Main List Norgesinvestor
Norgesinvestor 2 + 
HitecVision V LP
1998 2006 12.12.2005 20.05.2011 BO www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
45 Hemtex AB SE O-list Priveq 06.10.2005 VC www.priveq.se
Argentum.no  + 
www.priveq.se
46 HMS Networks AB SE OMX Main Segulah Advisor AB 2004 19.10.2007 BO www.segulah.se www.segulah.se
47 International Maritime Exchange ASANO Main List Incitia Ventures 2001 2007 04.04.2005 VC www.incitia.com Argentum.no
48 Intrum Justitia AB SE O-list IK Investment Partners IK 1997 1998 2005 07.06.2002 BO www.ikinvest.com Argentum.no
49 InvivoSense ASA NO Axess Viking Venture 2007 06.06.2007 15.12.2009 VC www.vikingventure.no www.vikingventure.no
50 KappAhl Holding AB SE O-list Nordic Capital Nordic Capital Fund V 2004 2006 23.02.2006 BO
Argentum.no   +   
www.nordiccapital.com
Argentum.no




51 Karo Bio AB SE O-list NB Capital + Health cap 03.04.1998 BO www.nbcapital.net www.nbcapital.net
52
Kongsberg Automotive Holdings 
ASA
NO SMB FSN Capital FSN Capital 1 2001 2005 24.06.2005 BO www.fsncapital.com Suneel Regulla, FSNcapital
53 Labs2 Group AB SE First North Northzone 15.03.2004 30.12.2011 vc www.northzone.com http://www.northzone.com/
54 LifeCycle Pharma DK Main- DK Nordic Biotech 13.11.2006 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
55 Lindab International AB SE - Ratos 2001 2006 01.12.2006 RBO www.ratos.se +   Argentum.noArgentum.no
56 Luxo NO SMB Norgesinvestor Norgesinvestor I 1997 2005 15.05.1998 30.06.2009 BO www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
57 Mamut ASA NO SMB Northzone 2004 10.05.2004 25.07.2011 VC www.northzone.com www.northzone.com
58 Mandamus Fastigheter AB SE O-list Accent Equity Partners AB 1997 15.06.1998 19.11.2003 BO www.accentequity.se SVCA.se
59 Marine Farms NO SMB Marin Forvaltning AS Marin Vekst 1 2004 2007 12.10.2006 25.11.2010 BO Lisbeth M. Iversen, Menon  + Argentum.norgentu .no
60 Micronic Laser Systems AB SE O-list Industrifonden 2005 09.03.2000 VC www.industrifonden.se www.industrifonden.se
61 Morphic Technologies AB SE First North Volvo Technology Transfer Volvo Technology Transfer 2003 01.09.2004 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
62 NEAS ASA NO - Reiten & Co Nordic Capital Partners IV 2000 23.03.2007 VC Argentum.no + www.reitenco.noArgentum.no
63 Nederman Holding AB SE OMX Main EQT EQT Denmark 1999 2007 16.05.2007 BO www.eqt.se  + Argentum.no Argentum.no
64 NextGenTel Holding NO SMB Northzone 19.12.2003 17.07.2006 VC www.northzone.com Argentum.no
65 Nobia AB SE O-list IK Investment Partners IK 1994 1996 2004 19.06.2002 BO www.ikinvest.com + Argentum.noArgentum.no
66 NordiagG ASA NO SMB Sarsiaseed
 Sarsia LifeScuence Fond, 
Sarsia Innovation, Convexa 
III, SåkorninVest
2002 14.12.2005 VC Argentum.no
Jon T Berg, Sarsia Seed 
Management AS 
67 Norwegian Energy Company ASA NO Hitec vision Energivekst 2005 2009 09.11.2007 PE www.hitecvision.com Hilde S. Hansen, HitecVision
68 Odim NO SMB Verdane + Norvestor 18.11.2005 21.04.2010 CM Rebecca Farr, Norvestor Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
69 Odim Hitec ASA NO Main Norsk Vekst 1997 2006 17.06.2001 31.10.2003 BO Norsk Vekst     www.norvestor.no/SVCA.se
70 Opera Sorftware ASA NO SMB Teknoinvest Management AS Teknoinvest VIII KS 2004 2005 11.03.2004 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
71 Orexo AB SE O-list HealthCap
Scandinavian Life Science 
Venture + HealthCap III 
2005 09.11.2005 VC www.healthcap.se + Argentum.noArgentum.no
72 Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. SE O-list IK Investment Partners IK 1997 1999 2006 24.03.2004 BO www.ikinvest.com    + Agentum.noArgentum.no
73 Perlos Oyj FI MAIN LIST EQT EQT I 1996 1999 28.06.1999 BO www.eqt.se SVCA.se
74 Photocure ASA NO Main Bio Fund Ventures I 1999 2000 29.05.2000 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
75 Polimoon NO Main List CVC Capital Partners A/S 1999 2006 26.04.2005 15.02.2007 BO www.cvc.com SVCA.se
76 Powel NO SMB Viking Venture 24.10.2005 22.01.2010 VC www.vikingventure.no Argentum.no
77 Precise Biometrics AB SE O-list Centrecourt AB 03.10.2000 VC www.centrecourt.se SVCA.se   + Argentum.no
78 Proffice AB SE O-list Reiten&co Nordic Capital Partners I 1996 1999 11.10.1999 VC www.reitenco.no www.reitenco.no
79 Pronova BioPharma ASA NO Main
Herkules Capital + Birk 
ventures
Herkules Private Equity Fund 
I
2004 11.10.2007 VC Lisbeth M. Iversen, Menon + www.herkulescapital.no + Argentum.now.birkv nture.no
80 Q-Med AB SE O-list HealthCap AB 06.12.1999 25.03.2011 VC www.healthcap.se SVCA.se
81 Readsorf AB SE O-list Priveq 22.06.1999 VC www.priveq.se Argentum  + www.priveq.se
82
Renewable Energy Corporation 
ASA
NO Main Hafslund Venture AS Hafslund Venture 1998 09.05.2006 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
83 Revus Energy NO SMB Hitec Vision
Energivekst (HitecVision 
Private Equity III)
2003 2005 27.05.2005 30.12.2008 PE Hilde S. Hansen, HitecVision +   Agentum.noHilde S. Hansen, HitecVision
84 Salcomp Oyj FI MAIN LIST EQT EQT 2 1999 2006 17.03.2006 BO www.eqt.se   +  Argentum.no Argentum.no
85 Satama Interactive Oyj FI NM LIST Capman Finnventure Rahasto III 1998 2000 17.03.2000 VC Argentum.no Argentum.no
86 SCAN Geophysical ASA NO Axess Norvestor Equity Norvestor IV LP 2005 2009 31.05.2007 09.07.2009 BO http://www.norvestor.no Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
87 Scandinavian Retail Group NO SMB Norsk Vekst 02.04.1998 PE
88 Scribona NO Main Norvestor 2005 10.05.2001 30.10.2003 CM www.norvestor.no Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
89 Sense Communications InternationalNO Main Norsk Vekst 2000 22.12.2000 11.01.2003 VC http://www.norvestor.no Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
90 Stepstone NO Main Northzone Ventures 14.03.2000 16.12.2009 VC Stine Foss, Northzone + www.northzone.comArgentum n
91 Synnøve Finden Meierier NO SMB Norvestor 1996 2007 06.07.1998 18.08.2009 PE www.norvestor.no www.norvestor.no
92 Talvivaaran Kaivososakeyhitiö OY FI MAIN LIST Suomen Teollisuussijoitus Oy 2008 11.05.2009 VC www.industryinvestment.com
93 Tele1 Europe Holding AB SE O-list Reiten
Nordic Capital
Partners I
1996 2001 15.03.2000 10.01.2005 PE www.reitenco.no
94 TeleComputing NO Main Convexa 29.06.2000 05.02.2010 VC www.convexa.no Argentum.no
95 Teleste Oyj FI MAIN LIST Sponsor Capital Oy 1997 2000 06.04.1999 LBO www.sponsor.fi
Marit Suominen, Sponsor 
Capital
96 Ticket Travel Group AB SE A-list Procuritas
Procuritas MBO Investment 
Consortium (PMIC)
1993 1997 01.07.1999 09.04.2010 BO www.procuritas.se www.procuritas.se
97 Topotarget A/S DK Main- DK HealtCap 10.06.2005 VC www.healthcap.se
Argentum.no + 
www.unquote.com
98 TradeDoubler AB SE O-list Verdane Capital Verdane Capital V K/S 2006 08.11.2005 VC www.verdanecapital.com + Argentum.noArgentum.no
99 Tripep AB SE O-list HealthCap AB 14.07.2000 29.09.2009 VC www.healthcap.se SVCA.se
100 Trolltech NO SMB Northzone 2000 05.07.2006 17.06.2008 VC www.northzone.com Argentum.no
101 Utfors AB SE O-list Litorina Norsk vekst Litorina Fund I 1999 2004 11.12.2000 31.05.2004 BO www.litorina.se   +  Argentum.noArgentum.no
102 Via Travel Group NO SMB NorgesInvestor NorgesInvestor III 2003 2005 09.06.2005 25.10.2005 L/M-BO www.norgesinvestor.no
Staale Myrstad, 
Norgesinvestor
103 Vision Park Entertainment AB SE O-list Accent Equity Partners AB 1998 08.06.2000 14.11.2001 BO www.accentequity.se SVCA.se
104 Webcenter Solutions NO SMB Norvestor 2001 19.06.2000 CM www.norvestor.no Rebecca Farr, Norvestor
  XIV 
  
Excluded samples








delisting Classification Source PE Funding Source Classification
105 A-COM AB SE O-list CVC Capital Partners A/S 1999 2009 04.11.1999 BO www.cvc.com SVCA.se
106 Bavarian Nordic Research Institute A/SDK Main- DK NB Capital 04.11.1998 BO www.nbcapital.net www.nbcapital.net
107 Capio AB SE O-list Nordic Capital Nordic Capital Fund VI 2006 16.10.2000 17.11.2006 BO Argentum.no Argentum.no
108 Cash Guard AB SE O-list Accent Equity Partners AB 2003 29.05.2000 BO www.accentequity.se SVCA.se
109 Connecta AB SE Priveq 15.08.2002 BO www.priveq.se Argentum  + www.priveq.se
110 Connecta AB SE O-list Priveq 30.05.2005 BO www.priveq.se
Argentum.no  + 
www.priveq.se
111 Connecta AB (old) SE O-list Priveq 20.09.1999 29.06.2000 BO www.priveq.se
Argentum.no  + 
www.priveq.se
112 Contex A/S DK Main- DK EQT EQT Denmark , Ratos 1999 2007 23.02.1999 BO Argentum.no + www.eqt.se Argentum.no
113 Drillcon AB SE First North Traction 07.08.2006 x
114 Duroc AB SE O-list Traction 02.07.1999 x www.traction.se
115 EDB NO Main Norvestor 1999 27.06.1997 BO www.norvestor.no www.norvestor.no
116 Elcoteq Network OYJ FI
CAPMAN + Suomen  
Teollisuussijoitus Oy + MB 
Funds
1996 2000 26.11.1997 BO Andreas Rokne, Capman Andreas Rokne, Capman
117 ElectroMagnetic GeoServices ASA NO 30.03.2007 x Lisbeth M. Iversen, Menon
118 Falck DK Main- DK Nordic capital Nordic Capital Fund V 2004 2011 20.07.2004 23.02.2005 BO www.nordiccapital.com Argentum.no
119 Guide Konsult AB SE O-list Nordic Capital Nordic Capital Fund IV 2001 2006 27.05.1998 25.02.2000 BO
Argentum.no  + 
www.nordiccapital.com
Argentum.no
120 Gunnebo Industrier AB SE O-list Procuritas Pre-fund investments 1988 1990 14.06.2005 01.10.2008 BO www.procuritas.se www.procuritas.se
121 ITAB INREDNING AB SE Priveq 31.05.2004 x www.priveq.se
122 ITAB Shop Concept AB SE A-list Priveq 08.07.2008 x www.priveq.se
123 ITAB Shop Concept AB SE First North 28.05.2004 08.07.2008 x
124 Lindab AB SE A-list 11.02.1998 03.08.2001 x
125 M&E Biotech DK Main- DK NB Capital 31.05.2000 BO www.nbcapital.net www.nbcapital.net
126 Mogul.com Group com AB SE O-list Affärsstrategerna AB Affarsstrategerna Fund(s) 1992 1999 11.09.2000 14.10.2003 VC
www.astrateg.se  + 
Argentum.no 
Claes-Göran Fridh, 
Affärsstrategerna AB  
127 Morphic Technologies AB SE A-list Volvo Technology Transfer Volvo Technology Transfer 2003 04.03.2008 VC
Argentum.no  +   
www.volvo.com/venturetech
Argentum.no
128 PCI Biotech Holding ASA NO Axess Birk Venture Birk Venture 2010 18.06.2008 x www.birkventure.no
Hans Ivar Robinson, Birk 
Venture
129 Pyrosequencing AB SE O-list NB Capital + Health cap 30.06.2000 BO www.nbcapital.net www.nbcapital.net
130 SOFTRONIC AB SE O-list Traction 04.12.1998 x www.traction.se
131 SWECO AB SE O-list CAPMAN + Finnventure Finnventure Rahasto V 2000 2004 21.09.1998 29.12.1999 BO Andreas Rokne, Capman Andreas Rokne, Capman
132 SwitchCore AB SE O-list Traction 06.12.1999 02.05.2008 x www.traction.se
133 Thalamus Networks AB SE O-list Traction 04.09.2000 x
134 TurnIT AB SE O-list Accent Equity Partners AB 1999 15.04.1998 27.05.2005 BO www.accentequity.se SVCA.se   + Argentum.no
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13.2 First Day Return 










return Source offering price Source Closing Price 
Ballingslöv AB SE BO 19.06.2002 64,0 21,2 -0,669 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Kongsberg Automotive Holdings ASA NO BO 24.06.2005 46,0 33,5 -0,272 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Ability Group ASA NO BO 03.07.2006 47,0 34,5 -0,265 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Synnøve Finden Meierier NO BO 06.07.1998 45,0 38,9 -0,135 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
Nobia AB SE BO 19.06.2002 78,0 71,0 -0,090 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Via Travel Group NO BO 09.06.2005 29,0 28,5 -0,017 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Marine Farms NO BO 12.10.2006 14,0 13,8 -0,014 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Polimoon NO BO 26.04.2005 21,5 21,2 -0,014 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
HMS Networks AB SE BO 19.10.2007 74,0 73,0 -0,014 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Odim Hitec ASA NO BO 17.06.2001 40,0 39,5 -0,013 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
Salcomp Oyj FI BO 17.03.2006 3,2 3,2 -0,003 Bloomberg Thomson Financial Datastream
Bjørge ASA NO BO 17.12.2004 7,0 7,0 0,000 thomsonreutersone.com oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Duni AB SE BO 14.11.2007 50,0 50,0 0,000 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Cermaq ASA NO BO 24.10.2005 44,0 44,1 0,002 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Lindab International AB SE BO 01.12.2006 110,0 112,8 0,025 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Teleste Oyj FI BO 06.04.1999 8,2 8,4 0,028 Bloomberg nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Revus Energy NO BO 27.05.2005 42,0 44,0 0,048 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
BE Group AB SE BO 24.11.2006 62,0 65,0 0,048 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
KappAhl Holding AB SE BO 23.02.2006 56,0 58,8 0,049 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Expert Eilag NO BO 14.04.2000 55,0 58,0 0,055 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Norwegian Energy Company ASA NO BO 09.11.2007 33,0 34,8 0,056 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Intrum Justitia AB SE BO 07.06.2002 47,0 50,0 0,064 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Alfa Laval AB SE BO 17.05.2002 91,0 98,0 0,077 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Oriflame Cosmetics S.A. SE BO 24.03.2004 190,0 208,5 0,097 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Nederman Holding AB SE BO 16.05.2007 87,0 95,5 0,098 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Grenland Group NO BO 12.12.2005 18,0 21,1 0,173 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Gant Company AB SE BO 28.03.2006 141,0 193,5 0,372 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm Thomson Financial Datastream
TeleComputing NO VC 29.06.2000 85,0 58,0 -0,317 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
C Technologies AB SE VC 15.06.2000 125,0 94,1 -0,247 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Sense Communications International NO VC 22.12.2000 25,0 19,0 -0,240 Bloomberg Thomson Financial Datastream
BioInvent International AB SE VC 12.06.2001 62,0 52,0 -0,161 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
AKVA GROUP ASA NO VC 10.11.2006 35,0 31,4 -0,104 Annual Report 2006 oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Genmab DK VC 18.10.2000 260,0 233,0 -0,104 newsclient.omxgroup.com nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Funcom NO VC 13.12.2005 15,0 13,5 -0,100 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Renewable Energy Corporation ASA NO VC 09.05.2006 95,0 85,5 -0,100 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
NextGenTel Holding NO VC 19.12.2003 25,0 22,7 -0,092 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
Photocure ASA NO VC 29.05.2000 155,0 141,3 -0,088 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Algeta ASA NO VC 27.03.2007 47,0 43,1 -0,083 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
24SEVENOFFICE ASA NO VC 22.06.2007 14,0 13,5 -0,036 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
NEAS ASA NO VC 23.03.2007 33,0 32,0 -0,030 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Mamut ASA NO VC 10.05.2004 7,0 6,8 -0,029 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Consorte Group NO VC 13.06.2001 12,0 11,8 -0,019 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Global IP Solutions NO VC 22.07.2008 10,0 9,9 -0,014 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
InvivoSense ASA NO VC 06.06.2007 17,0 17,0 0,000 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
Orexo AB SE VC 09.11.2005 90,0 90,0 0,000 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Powel NO VC 24.10.2005 15,0 15,0 0,000 www.newsweb.no Thomson Financial Datastream
TradeDoubler AB SE VC 08.11.2005 110,0 110,0 0,000 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Biotec Pharmacon ASA NO VC 04.11.2005 24,5 24,9 0,017 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Clavis Pharma ASA NO VC 07.07.2006 45,5 46,5 0,022 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Pronova BioPharma ASA NO VC 11.10.2007 23,0 23,8 0,035 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Badger explorer ASA NO VC 12.06.2007 32,0 33,9 0,059 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
LifeCycle Pharma DK VC 13.11.2006 44,0 47,1 0,070 newsclient.omxgroup.com nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Trolltech NO VC 05.07.2006 16,0 17,5 0,094 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk Thomson Financial Datastream
Micronic Laser Systems AB SE VC 09.03.2000 105,0 116,7 0,112 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm Thomson Financial Datastream
Aerocrine AB SE VC 15.06.2007 25,0 28,0 0,120 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Exiqon A/S DK VC 29.05.2007 40,0 45,0 0,125 newsclient.omxgroup.com nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Opera Sorftware ASA NO VC 11.03.2004 10,0 11,4 0,140 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Topotarget A/S DK VC 10.06.2005 22,5 26,3 0,169 newsclient.omxgroup.com nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Hemtex AB SE VC 06.10.2005 56,0 66,5 0,188 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Aldata Solution Oyj FI VC 27.10.1999 9,3 11,2 0,204 Bloomberg nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Readsorf AB SE VC 22.06.1999 25,0 31,0 0,240 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
Aresa (Aqualife) DK VC 14.02.2006 52,0 66,0 0,269 newsclient.omxgroup.com nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
International Maritime Exchange ASA NO VC 04.04.2005 81,0 103,0 0,272 www.oslobors.no , Emisjonsstatistikk oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
Ellen AB  SE VC 30.08.2007 2,5 3,2 0,288 Bloomberg Thomson Financial Datastream
Proffice AB SE VC 11.10.1999 84,0 110,5 0,315 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
BioGaia Biologics AB SE VC 28.05.1998 24,0 39,5 0,646 Ulf Persson, OMX Nasdaq Stockholm nasdaqomxnordic.com/shares
NordiagG ASA NO VC 14.12.2005 10,0 27,2 1,718 www.newsweb.no oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet
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13.3 Cumulative Abnormal Returns – Calendar time 
13.3.1 The time series  
  
Benchmark:
Date: BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC) BO VC (BO - VC)
01.06.1998 -0,074 -0,074 -0,070 -0,070
01.07.1998 0,000 -0,180 -0,001 -0,180 0,031 -0,149 0,029 -0,149
01.08.1998 0,002 -0,138 0,022 -0,152 -0,325 -0,465 -0,305 -0,479
01.09.1998 0,010 -0,038 0,048 0,027 0,039 -0,012 -0,100 -0,148 0,048 -0,083 -0,071 -0,012
01.10.1998 -0,136 -0,178 0,042 -0,171 -0,269 0,098 0,075 0,036 0,039 0,041 -0,054 0,096
01.11.1998 0,040 -0,009 0,050 0,044 -0,035 0,078 0,063 0,038 0,025 0,050 0,013 0,037
01.12.1998 -0,049 0,077 -0,126 -0,043 -0,030 -0,013 0,051 0,177 -0,126 0,057 0,071 -0,013
01.01.1999 -0,009 0,095 -0,104 -0,001 0,099 -0,100 0,116 0,211 -0,096 0,120 0,216 -0,096
01.02.1999 -0,011 -0,058 0,046 0,000 -0,065 0,066 -0,124 -0,170 0,046 -0,112 -0,177 0,065
01.03.1999 -0,064 0,039 -0,104 -0,080 0,054 -0,134 0,040 0,142 -0,101 0,020 0,156 -0,136
01.04.1999 -0,039 -0,122 0,082 -0,073 -0,118 0,045 0,059 -0,015 0,074 0,048 -0,011 0,059
01.05.1999 0,117 0,032 0,085 0,097 0,040 0,057 0,066 -0,025 0,091 0,043 -0,018 0,061
01.06.1999 -0,020 -0,135 0,115 -0,080 -0,113 0,034 0,153 0,038 0,115 0,093 0,060 0,034
01.07.1999 -0,020 -0,031 0,011 -0,022 -0,025 0,003 0,030 0,020 0,010 0,028 0,026 0,002
01.08.1999 -0,022 0,359 -0,381 -0,002 0,451 -0,453 -0,013 0,355 -0,368 0,006 0,438 -0,432
01.09.1999 -0,038 -0,115 0,077 -0,035 -0,150 0,115 0,004 -0,073 0,077 0,007 -0,108 0,115
01.10.1999 -0,097 -0,013 -0,083 0,010 0,070 -0,060 0,095 0,107 -0,012 0,201 0,122 0,079
01.11.1999 -0,115 0,097 -0,212 -0,075 0,082 -0,157 0,150 0,362 -0,212 0,190 0,347 -0,157
01.12.1999 0,078 0,198 -0,120 0,543 0,245 0,298 0,501 0,626 -0,125 0,973 0,667 0,306
01.01.2000 0,054 0,998 -0,944 0,151 0,606 -0,455 0,031 0,976 -0,945 0,129 0,583 -0,455
01.02.2000 0,066 0,136 -0,070 -0,009 0,115 -0,125 0,322 0,392 -0,070 0,247 0,371 -0,124
01.03.2000 -0,006 -0,052 0,046 -0,096 -0,016 -0,081 -0,046 -0,116 0,070 -0,140 -0,067 -0,073
01.04.2000 -0,047 -0,069 0,023 0,029 -0,094 0,123 -0,007 -0,088 0,081 0,055 -0,102 0,157
01.05.2000 0,054 -0,004 0,058 -0,053 -0,064 0,012 -0,096 -0,116 0,020 -0,168 -0,170 0,002
01.06.2000 -0,061 -0,035 -0,026 -0,054 0,041 -0,095 -0,064 -0,033 -0,031 -0,058 0,040 -0,098
01.07.2000 0,036 0,072 -0,036 0,009 0,205 -0,196 -0,104 -0,067 -0,037 -0,132 0,068 -0,200
01.08.2000 0,027 0,129 -0,102 0,046 0,016 0,030 0,054 0,154 -0,100 0,071 0,038 0,033
01.09.2000 0,079 0,079 0,000 -0,049 0,050 -0,098 -0,123 -0,127 0,004 -0,251 -0,162 -0,089
01.10.2000 -0,108 -0,020 -0,088 -0,153 -0,031 -0,122 -0,169 -0,100 -0,069 -0,215 -0,096 -0,118
01.11.2000 -0,024 -0,050 0,027 -0,135 -0,081 -0,054 -0,107 -0,159 0,052 -0,219 -0,168 -0,051
01.12.2000 0,000 -0,097 0,097 -0,017 -0,029 0,012 0,049 -0,041 0,089 0,029 0,028 0,001
01.01.2001 0,062 0,086 -0,024 0,035 0,086 -0,050 0,000 0,021 -0,020 -0,026 0,022 -0,048
01.02.2001 0,077 -0,093 0,170 -0,092 -0,075 -0,018 -0,289 -0,466 0,177 -0,459 -0,447 -0,012
01.03.2001 -0,002 -0,062 0,061 -0,063 -0,059 -0,003 -0,231 -0,295 0,064 -0,294 -0,292 -0,002
01.04.2001 -0,051 -0,180 0,130 0,057 -0,137 0,194 0,341 0,197 0,144 0,446 0,240 0,206
01.05.2001 0,010 0,187 -0,177 -0,010 0,113 -0,123 -0,106 0,019 -0,124 -0,126 -0,029 -0,097
01.06.2001 -0,043 -0,116 0,073 -0,148 -0,104 -0,043 -0,178 -0,257 0,078 -0,296 -0,252 -0,044
01.07.2001 0,000 -0,055 0,055 -0,091 -0,151 0,060 -0,022 -0,089 0,067 -0,116 -0,175 0,058
01.08.2001 -0,063 -0,035 -0,028 -0,115 0,021 -0,137 -0,232 -0,258 0,026 -0,337 -0,202 -0,136
01.09.2001 -0,055 -0,088 0,032 0,016 -0,066 0,082 -0,278 -0,310 0,032 -0,207 -0,288 0,081
01.10.2001 -0,014 0,041 -0,055 0,086 -0,050 0,137 0,257 0,311 -0,054 0,357 0,219 0,138
01.11.2001 0,185 0,422 -0,237 0,089 0,141 -0,052 0,312 0,371 -0,060 0,231 0,267 -0,036
01.12.2001 -0,109 0,124 -0,232 -0,093 0,182 -0,275 -0,033 0,189 -0,222 0,004 0,243 -0,239
01.01.2002 -0,080 0,023 -0,103 -0,114 0,049 -0,163 -0,219 -0,108 -0,111 -0,251 -0,085 -0,166
01.02.2002 -0,178 -0,034 -0,145 -0,116 -0,010 -0,106 -0,181 -0,045 -0,136 -0,118 -0,016 -0,102
01.03.2002 -0,004 -0,041 0,038 0,001 -0,061 0,062 0,074 0,034 0,040 0,080 0,018 0,062
01.04.2002 -0,128 -0,013 -0,115 -0,097 -0,011 -0,085 -0,273 -0,191 -0,082 -0,232 -0,194 -0,037
01.05.2002 0,082 -0,056 0,138 -0,041 -0,027 -0,014 0,035 -0,104 0,139 -0,089 -0,075 -0,014
01.06.2002 -0,069 -0,061 -0,008 -0,063 -0,053 -0,010 -0,073 -0,063 -0,010 -0,065 -0,055 -0,010
01.07.2002 -0,043 -0,002 -0,041 -0,029 -0,039 0,010 -0,281 -0,273 -0,008 -0,262 -0,325 0,063
01.08.2002 -0,213 -0,240 0,027 0,017 -0,219 0,235 -0,159 -0,191 0,033 0,071 -0,172 0,244
01.09.2002 -0,158 -0,156 -0,002 -0,069 -0,310 0,241 -0,378 -0,391 0,013 -0,277 -0,537 0,260
01.10.2002 0,046 0,109 -0,063 -0,263 0,091 -0,354 0,351 0,356 -0,005 -0,023 0,332 -0,355
01.11.2002 0,022 0,110 -0,088 0,183 0,109 0,074 0,290 0,296 -0,006 0,399 0,311 0,088
01.12.2002 0,101 -0,079 0,180 0,099 -0,066 0,165 -0,192 -0,211 0,020 -0,064 -0,220 0,156
MSCI NordicNordic Index
Equally Weighted Value Weighted Equally Weighted Value Weighted




01.01.2003 -0,031 0,089 -0,120 -0,105 0,069 -0,174 -0,087 0,006 -0,093 -0,170 0,014 -0,184
01.02.2003 -0,033 -0,105 0,072 0,151 -0,100 0,252 -0,117 -0,149 0,032 0,085 -0,163 0,248
01.03.2003 0,981 -0,010 0,991 0,030 -0,069 0,099 0,191 -0,013 0,205 -0,015 -0,052 0,038
01.04.2003 0,025 -0,019 0,044 0,021 -0,001 0,022 0,335 0,215 0,120 0,346 0,271 0,074
01.05.2003 -0,069 0,131 -0,200 -0,036 0,076 -0,112 0,023 0,250 -0,227 0,096 0,195 -0,100
01.06.2003 0,044 0,107 -0,064 -0,016 0,149 -0,165 0,007 0,078 -0,071 -0,050 0,124 -0,174
01.07.2003 -0,043 -0,003 -0,040 -0,034 -0,017 -0,017 -0,003 0,014 -0,016 0,004 -0,002 0,005
01.08.2003 -0,060 -0,073 0,013 0,029 -0,056 0,084 0,061 0,050 0,011 0,150 0,068 0,083
01.09.2003 0,025 0,165 -0,140 0,016 0,180 -0,163 0,057 0,198 -0,142 0,050 0,212 -0,162
01.10.2003 -0,094 0,028 -0,122 -0,012 -0,057 0,045 0,051 0,175 -0,123 0,135 0,090 0,045
01.11.2003 0,095 0,090 0,005 0,078 0,029 0,049 0,146 0,147 -0,001 0,162 0,051 0,111
01.12.2003 0,000 -0,067 0,067 0,008 -0,087 0,095 0,096 -0,022 0,118 0,104 -0,034 0,137
01.01.2004 0,069 0,027 0,041 -0,056 0,030 -0,085 0,189 0,147 0,041 0,064 0,150 -0,086
01.02.2004 0,077 0,010 0,067 -0,084 0,015 -0,099 0,168 0,142 0,026 0,043 0,148 -0,105
01.03.2004 -0,015 -0,064 0,049 0,014 -0,051 0,065 -0,064 -0,114 0,050 -0,035 -0,101 0,066
01.04.2004 0,083 -0,014 0,097 0,156 -0,004 0,160 -0,069 -0,188 0,119 0,012 -0,178 0,190
01.05.2004 0,003 0,011 -0,009 0,014 0,049 -0,035 0,010 0,019 -0,009 0,021 0,056 -0,035
01.06.2004 -0,016 -0,057 0,042 -0,013 -0,022 0,009 0,071 0,025 0,046 0,074 0,058 0,016
01.07.2004 -0,001 -0,037 0,036 0,027 -0,058 0,085 -0,110 -0,104 -0,006 -0,081 -0,148 0,067
01.08.2004 -0,088 0,048 -0,136 -0,095 0,058 -0,153 -0,032 0,105 -0,137 -0,039 0,115 -0,153
01.09.2004 -0,089 0,055 -0,144 -0,034 0,078 -0,113 0,098 0,239 -0,141 0,153 0,262 -0,110
01.10.2004 -0,041 0,045 -0,086 -0,043 0,026 -0,070 0,014 0,100 -0,086 0,012 0,081 -0,070
01.11.2004 -0,019 -0,088 0,069 0,035 -0,084 0,119 0,191 0,122 0,068 0,246 0,126 0,120
01.12.2004 0,126 0,220 -0,093 0,026 0,177 -0,150 0,141 0,205 -0,064 0,041 0,144 -0,103
01.01.2005 0,055 0,017 0,038 0,030 0,034 -0,004 -0,010 -0,033 0,023 -0,021 -0,016 -0,005
01.02.2005 0,033 -0,039 0,072 0,053 -0,065 0,117 0,135 0,091 0,044 0,180 0,066 0,114
01.03.2005 0,004 0,107 -0,104 -0,008 0,062 -0,071 -0,039 0,060 -0,099 -0,051 0,011 -0,062
01.04.2005 -0,083 -0,050 -0,032 -0,110 -0,080 -0,030 -0,120 -0,148 0,028 -0,130 -0,155 0,025
01.05.2005 -0,049 -0,007 -0,042 -0,006 0,023 -0,029 0,010 0,047 -0,037 0,048 0,076 -0,028
01.06.2005 0,021 0,158 -0,137 -0,033 0,094 -0,126 0,037 0,169 -0,132 -0,023 0,104 -0,127
01.07.2005 -0,007 0,006 -0,013 -0,002 0,037 -0,039 0,039 0,107 -0,068 0,012 0,144 -0,132
01.08.2005 0,103 0,047 0,056 0,123 0,079 0,044 0,173 0,153 0,021 0,202 0,178 0,024
01.09.2005 -0,017 0,160 -0,178 -0,066 0,148 -0,215 -0,005 0,195 -0,201 -0,054 0,173 -0,227
01.10.2005 -0,024 -0,063 0,039 -0,034 -0,090 0,055 -0,114 -0,155 0,041 -0,124 -0,182 0,058
01.11.2005 -0,089 0,042 -0,131 -0,115 0,001 -0,116 -0,052 0,079 -0,131 -0,074 0,037 -0,111
01.12.2005 0,016 0,014 0,002 0,004 0,029 -0,025 0,132 0,130 0,002 0,120 0,137 -0,017
01.01.2006 0,171 0,006 0,165 0,171 -0,011 0,181 0,301 0,129 0,172 0,303 0,116 0,187
01.02.2006 0,096 0,059 0,037 0,089 0,032 0,057 0,114 0,089 0,025 0,107 0,053 0,054
01.03.2006 -0,004 0,069 -0,072 0,038 0,108 -0,070 0,182 0,264 -0,082 0,224 0,281 -0,057
01.04.2006 0,073 0,040 0,033 0,033 0,051 -0,018 0,160 0,132 0,028 0,120 0,139 -0,019
01.05.2006 0,061 0,004 0,057 0,043 -0,012 0,055 -0,036 -0,096 0,060 -0,049 -0,117 0,068
01.06.2006 -0,043 -0,003 -0,040 -0,036 -0,011 -0,026 -0,080 -0,043 -0,037 -0,073 -0,048 -0,026
01.07.2006 -0,004 -0,025 0,021 -0,003 -0,056 0,054 -0,041 -0,065 0,023 -0,040 -0,095 0,055
01.08.2006 -0,026 0,074 -0,100 -0,074 -0,004 -0,070 0,037 0,150 -0,113 -0,021 0,070 -0,091
01.09.2006 -0,037 0,093 -0,129 -0,031 0,062 -0,093 -0,014 0,053 -0,067 0,000 0,071 -0,071
01.10.2006 0,062 -0,062 0,123 0,058 0,004 0,054 0,198 0,086 0,112 0,194 0,137 0,057
01.11.2006 0,021 -0,010 0,031 0,029 0,073 -0,044 0,120 0,079 0,040 0,129 0,169 -0,040
01.12.2006 -0,016 -0,017 0,001 -0,006 -0,053 0,047 0,106 0,094 0,012 0,122 0,063 0,059
01.01.2007 0,027 0,012 0,015 0,042 0,250 -0,208 0,100 0,072 0,028 0,121 0,317 -0,196
01.02.2007 0,055 -0,014 0,070 0,073 -0,111 0,183 -0,044 -0,082 0,038 -0,015 -0,184 0,170
01.03.2007 0,010 0,047 -0,037 -0,002 0,012 -0,014 0,141 0,125 0,017 0,127 0,149 -0,022
01.04.2007 0,029 -0,001 0,029 0,019 0,157 -0,138 0,182 0,139 0,042 0,173 0,307 -0,134
01.05.2007 0,027 -0,023 0,051 0,009 0,057 -0,048 0,081 0,021 0,059 0,067 0,102 -0,035
01.06.2007 0,021 0,063 -0,042 0,003 0,202 -0,199 0,027 0,055 -0,028 0,012 0,215 -0,203
01.07.2007 -0,006 -0,019 0,012 -0,009 0,001 -0,009 -0,052 -0,088 0,036 -0,053 -0,055 0,003
01.08.2007 -0,015 -0,060 0,044 -0,028 -0,013 -0,016 -0,024 -0,035 0,012 -0,038 0,001 -0,039
01.09.2007 -0,012 -0,018 0,006 -0,013 0,102 -0,115 0,170 0,165 0,005 0,169 0,283 -0,114
01.10.2007 0,019 -0,023 0,042 -0,008 0,097 -0,105 0,019 -0,060 0,079 -0,006 0,083 -0,088
01.11.2007 -0,013 -0,056 0,043 -0,030 -0,037 0,007 -0,109 -0,151 0,042 -0,126 -0,125 -0,001
01.12.2007 0,066 0,025 0,042 0,052 0,068 -0,016 0,014 0,007 0,007 -0,003 0,038 -0,041




01.01.2008 -0,078 0,057 -0,135 -0,102 -0,330 0,228 -0,245 -0,145 -0,100 -0,270 -0,526 0,256
01.02.2008 0,082 0,007 0,075 0,124 -0,099 0,223 0,141 0,071 0,070 0,182 -0,037 0,219
01.03.2008 -0,038 0,002 -0,040 -0,024 0,144 -0,168 0,034 0,015 0,019 0,057 0,181 -0,125
01.04.2008 0,025 0,016 0,009 -0,007 0,146 -0,152 0,024 0,041 -0,017 -0,010 0,160 -0,170
01.05.2008 0,041 -0,021 0,062 0,029 -0,124 0,153 0,078 0,027 0,051 0,089 -0,068 0,157
01.06.2008 0,018 0,024 -0,006 0,002 -0,028 0,030 -0,219 -0,203 -0,015 -0,236 -0,252 0,016
01.07.2008 0,011 -0,014 0,026 0,000 0,113 -0,112 -0,064 -0,085 0,022 -0,081 0,045 -0,127
01.08.2008 -0,056 -0,042 -0,014 -0,059 0,119 -0,179 -0,134 -0,122 -0,012 -0,137 0,037 -0,174
01.09.2008 -0,037 -0,024 -0,013 -0,057 -0,156 0,099 -0,500 -0,435 -0,065 -0,521 -0,597 0,075
01.10.2008 -0,082 -0,100 0,018 -0,089 -0,162 0,073 -0,522 -0,537 0,015 -0,528 -0,605 0,077
01.11.2008 -0,035 0,041 -0,077 -0,068 -0,035 -0,033 -0,357 -0,318 -0,039 -0,368 -0,384 0,017
01.12.2008 -0,131 -0,092 -0,039 -0,076 0,055 -0,132 0,144 0,090 0,054 0,199 0,293 -0,094
01.01.2009 0,034 0,215 -0,181 0,045 0,058 -0,014 -0,187 0,044 -0,232 -0,192 -0,160 -0,032
01.02.2009 -0,048 0,042 -0,090 -0,044 -0,093 0,048 -0,203 -0,215 0,013 -0,198 -0,310 0,112
01.03.2009 0,029 -0,058 0,087 -0,018 -0,029 0,011 0,306 0,275 0,031 0,257 0,326 -0,069
01.04.2009 0,020 -0,042 0,061 0,172 -0,070 0,242 0,380 0,297 0,083 0,541 0,299 0,241
01.05.2009 0,206 0,051 0,155 0,133 0,038 0,095 0,415 0,392 0,023 0,405 0,342 0,063
01.06.2009 -0,092 0,088 -0,179 -0,056 -0,006 -0,050 -0,131 0,012 -0,144 -0,100 -0,018 -0,082
01.07.2009 -0,054 -0,004 -0,050 -0,064 0,055 -0,118 0,127 0,151 -0,024 0,156 0,255 -0,099
01.08.2009 0,052 0,177 -0,125 0,036 0,062 -0,026 0,055 -0,003 0,058 0,039 -0,071 0,110
01.09.2009 -0,002 0,075 -0,077 0,037 0,067 -0,030 0,072 0,179 -0,107 0,110 0,180 -0,070
01.10.2009 0,044 -0,011 0,055 0,046 -0,022 0,069 0,031 0,060 -0,028 0,010 0,048 -0,038
01.11.2009 0,038 0,006 0,032 0,021 -0,061 0,081 0,128 0,044 0,084 0,128 0,047 0,081
01.12.2009 -0,036 0,045 -0,081 -0,022 0,051 -0,073 -0,078 -0,002 -0,076 -0,066 0,003 -0,070
01.01.2010 0,057 0,151 -0,093 0,008 -0,005 0,014 0,053 0,129 -0,076 0,008 -0,007 0,015
01.02.2010 -0,036 -0,008 -0,028 -0,031 0,027 -0,058 -0,061 -0,041 -0,020 -0,056 0,010 -0,066
01.03.2010 0,044 -0,084 0,128 0,022 -0,053 0,075 0,213 0,141 0,071 0,191 0,139 0,051
01.04.2010 -0,003 0,061 -0,064 -0,063 0,014 -0,077 0,001 0,084 -0,083 -0,062 0,030 -0,092
01.05.2010 -0,059 0,022 -0,080 -0,074 0,002 -0,077 -0,319 -0,234 -0,085 -0,333 -0,258 -0,074
01.06.2010 -0,018 -0,007 -0,011 -0,068 -0,187 0,119 -0,056 -0,108 0,052 -0,112 -0,252 0,140
01.07.2010 0,086 0,000 0,086 0,113 0,060 0,052 0,465 0,142 0,324 0,493 0,329 0,164
01.08.2010 0,003 -0,095 0,098 -0,034 -0,170 0,135 -0,092 -0,190 0,098 -0,130 -0,265 0,135
01.09.2010 0,065 -0,060 0,125 0,084 -0,158 0,242 0,297 0,018 0,280 0,316 0,046 0,269
01.10.2010 0,078 -0,102 0,073 -0,102 0,133 -0,047 0,127 -0,047
01.11.2010 0,014 0,002 -0,026 -0,051
Mean 0,004 0,017 -0,005 0,008 0,016 0,027 0,014 0,023
Std. Deviation 0,11 0,12 0,09 0,12 0,18 0,19 0,20 0,21
Independent T-test:
Mean Difference -0,013 -0,013 -0,010 -0,008
(t-value) (-0,99) (-1,09) (-0,48) (-0,35)
  XX 













BO 145 ,00 ,106 ,009
VC 145 ,02 ,123 ,010
Lower Upper
2,351 ,126 -,998 288 ,319 -,013 ,013 -,040 ,013
-,998 281,383 ,319 -,013 ,013 -,040 ,013
Benchmark: Nordic Index
Weighting: Value







BO 145 -,0053 ,08555 ,00710
VC 145 ,0078 ,11756 ,00976
 
Lower Upper
8,839 ,003 -1,086 288 ,279 -,01311 ,01207 -,03687 ,01066
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Group Statistics
Independent Samples Test
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BO 145 ,0162 ,17567 ,01459
VC 145 ,0266 ,19708 ,01637
 
Lower Upper
,672 ,413 -,475 288 ,635 -,01042 ,02192 -,05358 ,03273
-,475 284,273 ,635 -,01042 ,02192 -,05358 ,03273
Benchmark: MSCI Nordic
Weighting: Value







BO 145 ,0145 ,19969 ,01658
VC 145 ,0229 ,21058 ,01749
 
Lower Upper
,926 ,337 -,351 288 ,726 -,00845 ,02410 -,05588 ,03898
-,351 287,192 ,726 -,00845 ,02410 -,05588 ,03899
Group Statistics
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for 
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Group Statistics
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13.4 Single and Three Factor Regression 

















(SE E TRSD10T)- 
RED. YIELD
Data type: - - - -
Currency: - - - -
Code: DKBRYLD FNBRYLD NW10BND SDBND10
Start: 01.01.1998 01.01.1998 01.01.1998 01.01.1998
End: 01.01.2012 01.01.2012 01.01.2012 01.01.2012
Frecuency: M M M M
Date: Denmark Finland Norway Sweden Yearly Monthly
01.01.1998 5,63 5,52 5,49 0,35 0,30 0,35 0,0555 0,0045
01.02.1998 5,41 5,20 5,32 0,35 0,34 0,31 0,0531 0,0043
01.03.1998 5,23 5,07 5,28 0,34 0,37 0,29 0,0518 0,0042
01.04.1998 5,14 5,02 5,30 0,35 0,36 0,29 0,0514 0,0042
01.05.1998 5,21 5,14 5,46 0,32 0,39 0,29 0,0526 0,0043
01.06.1998 5,07 4,95 5,53 0,34 0,39 0,27 0,0515 0,0042
01.07.1998 4,96 4,94 5,57 0,34 0,41 0,25 0,0511 0,0042
01.08.1998 4,91 4,79 5,33 0,33 0,43 0,24 0,0496 0,0040
01.09.1998 4,76 4,62 5,72 0,40 0,38 0,23 0,0492 0,0040
01.10.1998 4,51 4,21 5,22 0,39 0,39 0,23 0,0455 0,0037
01.11.1998 4,70 4,51 5,54 0,37 0,39 0,23 0,0482 0,0039
01.12.1998 4,33 4,33 5,31 0,36 0,42 0,21 0,0454 0,0037
01.01.1999 4,23 4,04 5,32 0,34 0,49 0,18 0,0433 0,0035
01.02.1999 4,05 3,87 4,69 3,99 0,15 0,24 0,09 0,52 0,0403 0,0033
01.03.1999 4,44 4,27 4,99 4,56 0,14 0,25 0,09 0,52 0,0451 0,0037
01.04.1999 4,37 4,22 4,84 4,37 0,13 0,26 0,09 0,51 0,0437 0,0036
01.05.1999 4,27 4,11 4,74 4,24 0,13 0,28 0,09 0,50 0,0425 0,0035
01.06.1999 4,63 4,42 5,17 4,71 0,13 0,30 0,10 0,46 0,0466 0,0038
01.07.1999 4,91 4,77 5,67 5,13 0,12 0,32 0,10 0,46 0,0504 0,0041
01.08.1999 5,36 5,18 6,05 5,43 0,13 0,31 0,09 0,46 0,0540 0,0044
01.09.1999 5,46 5,21 5,91 5,61 0,14 0,32 0,10 0,45 0,0549 0,0045
01.10.1999 5,61 5,42 6,20 5,82 0,13 0,33 0,10 0,44 0,0569 0,0046
01.11.1999 5,59 5,39 6,14 5,73 0,12 0,35 0,08 0,44 0,0562 0,0046
01.12.1999 5,49 5,35 6,06 5,59 0,11 0,38 0,08 0,43 0,0552 0,0045
01.01.2000 5,71 5,65 6,25 5,86 0,10 0,41 0,07 0,42 0,0579 0,0047
01.02.2000 5,86 5,70 6,30 5,91 0,10 0,39 0,07 0,44 0,0585 0,0047
01.03.2000 5,80 5,67 6,30 5,81 0,09 0,38 0,07 0,47 0,0579 0,0047
01.04.2000 5,54 5,32 6,07 5,37 0,10 0,39 0,07 0,45 0,0541 0,0044
01.05.2000 5,65 5,48 6,18 5,46 0,09 0,40 0,06 0,45 0,0553 0,0045
01.06.2000 5,72 5,44 6,20 5,18 0,10 0,38 0,07 0,46 0,0540 0,0044
01.07.2000 5,76 5,48 6,21 5,31 0,10 0,38 0,07 0,45 0,0548 0,0045
01.08.2000 5,66 5,36 6,15 5,29 0,11 0,34 0,07 0,48 0,0541 0,0044
01.09.2000 5,63 5,44 6,23 5,25 0,11 0,35 0,08 0,47 0,0543 0,0044
01.10.2000 5,62 5,44 6,33 5,23 0,12 0,33 0,08 0,46 0,0544 0,0044
01.11.2000 5,52 5,44 6,33 5,16 0,12 0,35 0,08 0,45 0,0540 0,0044
01.12.2000 5,31 5,22 6,06 5,06 0,13 0,37 0,08 0,43 0,0523 0,0043
01.01.2001 5,16 5,06 5,97 4,86 0,13 0,37 0,08 0,42 0,0506 0,0041
01.02.2001 5,07 5,01 5,93 4,81 0,14 0,31 0,09 0,46 0,0501 0,0041
01.03.2001 5,05 4,98 5,95 4,83 0,16 0,28 0,10 0,47 0,0502 0,0041
01.04.2001 5,00 4,96 6,06 4,71 0,16 0,31 0,11 0,43 0,0498 0,0041
01.05.2001 5,31 5,29 6,35 5,14 0,13 0,35 0,10 0,42 0,0533 0,0043
01.06.2001 5,40 5,30 6,69 5,34 0,15 0,33 0,10 0,42 0,0547 0,0045
01.07.2001 5,37 5,33 6,70 5,49 0,15 0,30 0,11 0,44 0,0555 0,0045
01.08.2001 5,19 5,13 6,50 5,27 0,15 0,28 0,14 0,43 0,0538 0,0044
01.09.2001 5,07 5,00 6,41 5,12 0,16 0,26 0,14 0,44 0,0527 0,0043
Estimated                         
Nordic Risk Free 
Rate
Weights on Market Value acc. by 
country of total Nordic Index:
Input from DataStream
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01.10.2001 5,03 4,99 6,30 5,31 0,16 0,28 0,14 0,42 0,0531 0,0043
01.11.2001 4,56 4,50 5,75 4,80 0,15 0,31 0,13 0,41 0,0480 0,0039
01.12.2001 4,71 4,75 5,92 5,03 0,14 0,31 0,13 0,42 0,0501 0,0041
01.01.2002 5,15 5,12 6,32 5,35 0,13 0,32 0,13 0,42 0,0537 0,0044
01.02.2002 5,14 5,05 6,28 5,37 0,15 0,32 0,13 0,40 0,0535 0,0044
01.03.2002 5,21 5,17 6,41 5,46 0,15 0,31 0,13 0,41 0,0546 0,0044
01.04.2002 5,44 5,40 6,67 5,63 0,15 0,30 0,14 0,41 0,0568 0,0046
01.05.2002 5,37 5,26 6,69 5,65 0,16 0,28 0,15 0,41 0,0566 0,0046
01.06.2002 5,42 5,29 6,89 5,68 0,17 0,27 0,16 0,41 0,0572 0,0046
01.07.2002 5,22 5,09 6,66 5,48 0,17 0,27 0,15 0,40 0,0551 0,0045
01.08.2002 4,98 4,79 6,41 5,23 0,17 0,27 0,16 0,40 0,0526 0,0043
01.09.2002 4,79 4,58 6,14 5,10 0,17 0,28 0,16 0,39 0,0506 0,0041
01.10.2002 4,53 4,35 6,01 4,92 0,17 0,30 0,15 0,38 0,0485 0,0040
01.11.2002 4,70 4,54 6,17 5,05 0,16 0,31 0,15 0,38 0,0500 0,0041
01.12.2002 4,71 4,47 6,18 5,07 0,14 0,32 0,14 0,39 0,0498 0,0041
01.01.2003 4,33 4,08 5,80 4,71 0,16 0,30 0,15 0,39 0,0462 0,0038
01.02.2003 4,20 4,17 5,46 4,59 0,16 0,29 0,15 0,40 0,0453 0,0037
01.03.2003 4,15 3,95 5,24 4,46 0,16 0,29 0,14 0,41 0,0437 0,0036
01.04.2003 4,29 4,11 5,24 4,59 0,17 0,29 0,14 0,40 0,0449 0,0037
01.05.2003 4,29 4,15 5,28 4,70 0,17 0,28 0,14 0,42 0,0456 0,0037
01.06.2003 3,97 3,80 4,73 4,26 0,17 0,28 0,14 0,41 0,0415 0,0034
01.07.2003 3,98 3,85 4,66 4,36 0,19 0,26 0,14 0,41 0,0419 0,0034
01.08.2003 4,39 4,20 5,13 4,69 0,18 0,25 0,15 0,42 0,0458 0,0037
01.09.2003 4,40 4,22 4,96 4,72 0,18 0,26 0,14 0,42 0,0456 0,0037
01.10.2003 4,19 3,98 4,72 4,55 0,19 0,25 0,14 0,42 0,0436 0,0036
01.11.2003 4,53 4,38 4,96 4,98 0,19 0,25 0,14 0,42 0,0474 0,0039
01.12.2003 4,65 4,48 5,01 5,05 0,18 0,26 0,14 0,42 0,0483 0,0039
01.01.2004 4,46 4,27 4,61 4,78 0,18 0,24 0,15 0,43 0,0458 0,0037
01.02.2004 4,40 4,20 4,52 4,71 0,18 0,25 0,14 0,42 0,0450 0,0037
01.03.2004 4,21 4,03 4,02 4,48 0,18 0,25 0,15 0,42 0,0425 0,0035
01.04.2004 4,10 3,93 4,28 4,27 0,17 0,25 0,15 0,43 0,0416 0,0034
01.05.2004 4,34 4,13 4,89 4,56 0,18 0,22 0,16 0,45 0,0448 0,0037
01.06.2004 4,53 4,30 4,83 4,74 0,18 0,21 0,16 0,44 0,0462 0,0038
01.07.2004 4,47 4,25 4,54 4,67 0,18 0,21 0,16 0,44 0,0452 0,0037
01.08.2004 4,34 4,12 4,36 4,53 0,19 0,20 0,17 0,44 0,0438 0,0036
01.09.2004 4,16 3,96 4,24 4,38 0,18 0,20 0,17 0,45 0,0423 0,0035
01.10.2004 4,12 3,93 4,27 4,35 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,44 0,0421 0,0034
01.11.2004 3,94 3,77 4,08 4,20 0,18 0,21 0,17 0,44 0,0404 0,0033
01.12.2004 3,99 3,63 3,97 4,04 0,17 0,21 0,18 0,44 0,0393 0,0032
01.01.2005 3,82 3,48 3,99 3,95 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,44 0,0384 0,0031
01.02.2005 3,63 3,38 3,77 3,74 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,44 0,0365 0,0030
01.03.2005 3,80 3,72 3,95 3,89 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,43 0,0385 0,0032
01.04.2005 3,71 3,61 3,95 3,71 0,18 0,20 0,18 0,43 0,0373 0,0031
01.05.2005 3,45 3,40 3,77 3,38 0,19 0,20 0,18 0,43 0,0347 0,0028
01.06.2005 3,26 3,19 3,62 3,21 0,19 0,21 0,18 0,42 0,0329 0,0027
01.07.2005 3,09 3,10 3,47 2,97 0,18 0,21 0,20 0,41 0,0312 0,0026
01.08.2005 3,27 3,25 3,65 3,15 0,18 0,20 0,20 0,42 0,0329 0,0027
01.09.2005 3,04 3,01 3,52 2,96 0,18 0,20 0,22 0,41 0,0310 0,0026
01.10.2005 3,14 3,14 3,60 3,12 0,17 0,20 0,21 0,41 0,0323 0,0026
01.11.2005 3,37 3,36 3,86 3,30 0,18 0,21 0,20 0,41 0,0344 0,0028
01.12.2005 3,38 3,32 3,94 3,35 0,18 0,20 0,20 0,41 0,0347 0,0028
01.01.2006 3,33 3,27 3,67 3,37 0,18 0,20 0,20 0,41 0,0340 0,0028
01.02.2006 3,44 3,47 3,79 3,49 0,17 0,20 0,21 0,41 0,0354 0,0029
01.03.2006 3,53 3,47 3,70 3,43 0,17 0,21 0,21 0,41 0,0351 0,0029
01.04.2006 3,87 3,79 4,01 3,77 0,16 0,21 0,22 0,41 0,0384 0,0031
01.05.2006 4,01 3,93 4,12 3,92 0,16 0,20 0,23 0,41 0,0398 0,0033
01.06.2006 4,05 3,93 4,25 3,94 0,16 0,20 0,23 0,41 0,0402 0,0033
01.07.2006 4,12 4,03 4,35 4,04 0,16 0,20 0,23 0,40 0,0412 0,0034
01.08.2006 3,97 3,87 4,27 3,87 0,16 0,20 0,24 0,40 0,0398 0,0033
01.09.2006 3,79 3,69 4,10 3,70 0,17 0,20 0,23 0,40 0,0380 0,0031
01.10.2006 3,74 3,63 4,08 3,68 0,17 0,20 0,21 0,42 0,0376 0,0031
01.11.2006 3,74 3,67 4,19 3,63 0,17 0,19 0,22 0,42 0,0378 0,0031
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01.12.2006 3,65 3,62 4,12 3,56 0,17 0,19 0,22 0,42 0,0371 0,0030
01.01.2007 3,89 3,97 4,33 3,81 0,17 0,19 0,22 0,43 0,0397 0,0032
01.02.2007 4,03 4,06 4,51 4,03 0,17 0,19 0,22 0,42 0,0414 0,0034
01.03.2007 3,92 3,94 4,42 3,78 0,17 0,20 0,22 0,41 0,0397 0,0033
01.04.2007 4,01 4,06 4,57 3,92 0,17 0,19 0,22 0,42 0,0410 0,0034
01.05.2007 4,14 4,15 4,78 4,09 0,16 0,19 0,22 0,42 0,0426 0,0035
01.06.2007 4,45 4,46 5,06 4,30 0,17 0,20 0,22 0,41 0,0452 0,0037
01.07.2007 4,55 4,51 5,14 4,45 0,17 0,20 0,24 0,40 0,0464 0,0038
01.08.2007 4,35 4,40 4,97 4,29 0,17 0,20 0,23 0,40 0,0448 0,0037
01.09.2007 4,35 4,35 4,81 4,21 0,17 0,21 0,23 0,39 0,0440 0,0036
01.10.2007 4,45 4,40 4,94 4,32 0,17 0,21 0,24 0,38 0,0450 0,0037
01.11.2007 4,33 4,30 4,85 4,26 0,17 0,22 0,24 0,37 0,0442 0,0036
01.12.2007 4,19 4,19 4,64 4,17 0,17 0,22 0,24 0,37 0,0429 0,0035
01.01.2008 4,46 4,40 4,68 4,35 0,17 0,22 0,25 0,36 0,0446 0,0036
01.02.2008 4,07 4,01 4,35 3,97 0,17 0,24 0,23 0,37 0,0408 0,0033
01.03.2008 3,97 3,95 4,30 4,02 0,17 0,22 0,24 0,37 0,0406 0,0033
01.04.2008 4,19 4,12 4,40 4,01 0,17 0,22 0,23 0,37 0,0416 0,0034
01.05.2008 4,42 4,28 4,54 4,08 0,17 0,21 0,26 0,37 0,0430 0,0035
01.06.2008 4,67 4,50 4,69 4,34 0,18 0,20 0,26 0,36 0,0452 0,0037
01.07.2008 4,81 4,79 5,03 4,49 0,18 0,20 0,27 0,34 0,0476 0,0039
01.08.2008 4,65 4,53 4,87 4,19 0,19 0,20 0,26 0,35 0,0452 0,0037
01.09.2008 4,38 4,31 4,62 4,03 0,19 0,20 0,26 0,35 0,0430 0,0035
01.10.2008 4,32 4,25 4,27 3,78 0,19 0,20 0,23 0,37 0,0410 0,0034
01.11.2008 4,43 4,23 4,28 3,55 0,19 0,22 0,22 0,37 0,0403 0,0033
01.12.2008 3,84 3,52 3,80 2,83 0,20 0,22 0,21 0,37 0,0339 0,0028
01.01.2009 3,32 3,48 3,81 2,43 0,19 0,22 0,20 0,38 0,0312 0,0026
01.02.2009 3,68 3,76 3,65 3,08 0,20 0,21 0,22 0,37 0,0347 0,0028
01.03.2009 3,71 3,82 3,76 2,80 0,20 0,19 0,22 0,38 0,0340 0,0028
01.04.2009 3,59 3,68 3,74 3,05 0,18 0,19 0,22 0,41 0,0342 0,0028
01.05.2009 3,63 3,74 3,94 3,26 0,18 0,20 0,21 0,41 0,0356 0,0029
01.06.2009 3,93 4,09 4,26 3,82 0,18 0,20 0,22 0,41 0,0399 0,0033
01.07.2009 3,82 3,83 4,11 3,51 0,18 0,19 0,22 0,41 0,0376 0,0031
01.08.2009 3,58 3,65 4,03 3,41 0,18 0,18 0,21 0,43 0,0362 0,0030
01.09.2009 3,62 3,58 4,12 3,35 0,19 0,18 0,21 0,42 0,0360 0,0030
01.10.2009 3,53 3,53 4,16 3,31 0,18 0,18 0,22 0,42 0,0358 0,0029
01.11.2009 3,61 3,51 4,05 3,23 0,18 0,17 0,23 0,43 0,0353 0,0029
01.12.2009 3,50 3,40 3,87 3,22 0,17 0,17 0,23 0,42 0,0345 0,0028
01.01.2010 3,64 3,55 4,15 3,30 0,17 0,18 0,24 0,41 0,0360 0,0030
01.02.2010 3,51 3,41 3,99 3,30 0,18 0,18 0,23 0,42 0,0351 0,0029
01.03.2010 3,39 3,23 3,72 3,14 0,18 0,17 0,23 0,42 0,0333 0,0027
01.04.2010 3,40 3,21 3,83 3,21 0,17 0,18 0,22 0,43 0,0338 0,0028
01.05.2010 3,19 3,27 3,72 3,04 0,18 0,16 0,23 0,43 0,0326 0,0027
01.06.2010 2,68 2,88 3,38 2,64 0,18 0,17 0,21 0,43 0,0285 0,0023
01.07.2010 2,66 2,81 3,37 2,63 0,19 0,16 0,21 0,44 0,0282 0,0023
01.08.2010 2,79 2,92 3,26 2,79 0,18 0,16 0,21 0,44 0,0291 0,0024
01.09.2010 2,29 2,43 3,04 2,36 0,18 0,16 0,21 0,44 0,0250 0,0021
01.10.2010 2,39 2,54 3,23 2,57 0,18 0,17 0,21 0,45 0,0267 0,0022
01.11.2010 2,59 2,71 3,16 2,81 0,18 0,17 0,21 0,44 0,0283 0,0023
01.12.2010 2,90 3,04 3,43 3,02 0,18 0,16 0,21 0,45 0,0309 0,0025
01.01.2011 3,00 3,12 3,67 3,28 0,18 0,16 0,22 0,44 0,0329 0,0027
01.02.2011 3,25 3,39 3,79 3,43 0,18 0,16 0,23 0,44 0,0347 0,0028
01.03.2011 3,43 3,50 3,73 3,36 0,18 0,15 0,23 0,43 0,0348 0,0029
01.04.2011 3,62 3,70 3,84 3,38 0,18 0,15 0,24 0,43 0,0358 0,0029
01.05.2011 3,44 3,53 3,67 3,22 0,18 0,15 0,23 0,44 0,0341 0,0028
01.06.2011 3,21 3,30 3,35 2,94 0,18 0,15 0,23 0,44 0,0313 0,0026
01.07.2011 3,25 3,34 3,41 2,93 0,17 0,15 0,23 0,44 0,0316 0,0026
01.08.2011 2,74 2,90 2,83 2,47 0,18 0,14 0,24 0,44 0,0267 0,0022
01.09.2011 2,41 2,63 2,78 2,11 0,17 0,15 0,25 0,43 0,0240 0,0020
01.10.2011 2,02 2,28 2,38 1,69 0,11 0,17 0,30 0,43 0,0203 0,0017
01.11.2011 2,01 2,26 2,53 1,69 0,10 0,17 0,30 0,43 0,0207 0,0017
01.12.2011 1,90 2,75 2,57 1,80 0,10 0,17 0,30 0,42 0,0220 0,0018
01.01.2012 1,74 2,38 2,47 1,80 0,10 0,17 0,31 0,42 0,0210 0,0017
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Nordic Index            
1931 entities activly 
traded on Nordic 
Indexes
Estimated                    
Risk Free Rate 
(Monthly)
Data type: TOT RETURN IND Market Value -
Currency: US Dollar US Dollar -
Code: MSNORD$(MSRI)~U$ - -
Start: 01.01.1998 01.01.1998 01.01.1998
End: 01.01.2012 01.01.2012 01.01.2012
Frecuency: M M M
Date: - SMB HML BO VC
01.01.1998 5 546,1 0,019 491 820,2 -0,050 0,0045
01.02.1998 5 650,0 0,088 467 394,6 0,086 0,0043 -0,006 -0,023 
01.03.1998 6 148,3 0,076 507 659,3 0,057 0,0042 -0,047 -0,066 
01.04.1998 6 618,2 0,054 536 754,3 0,063 0,0042 0,018 0,017
01.05.1998 6 973,9 0,011 570 371,7 -0,003 0,0043 -0,017 -0,012 
01.06.1998 7 047,7 -0,000 568 415,3 0,005 0,0042 -0,051 -0,060 1
01.07.1998 7 047,1 0,025 571 479,9 0,009 0,0042 0,027 0,025 3 1
01.08.1998 7 221,6 -0,166 576 877,5 -0,187 0,0040 0,116 0,113 4 2
01.09.1998 6 022,4 -0,048 469 282,3 -0,071 0,0040 0,071 0,041 6 2
01.10.1998 5 731,3 0,087 436 107,3 0,129 0,0037 -0,138 -0,164 6 2
01.11.1998 6 232,1 0,050 492 186,6 -0,003 0,0039 -0,016 -0,043 6 2
01.12.1998 6 543,5 0,050 490 726,5 0,080 0,0037 -0,083 -0,110 7 2
01.01.1999 6 868,0 0,060 529 983,2 0,063 0,0035 0,027 0,043 7 2
01.02.1999 7 279,4 -0,048 563 371,0 -0,071 0,0033 0,011 0,011 7 2
01.03.1999 6 933,6 0,054 523 291,5 0,047 0,0037 -0,037 -0,037 7 2
01.04.1999 7 307,0 0,040 547 964,8 0,066 0,0036 0,165 0,207 7 2
01.05.1999 7 600,9 -0,035 584 252,1 -0,081 0,0035 0,045 0,061 8 2
01.06.1999 7 331,8 0,095 537 130,3 0,077 0,0038 0,064 0,110 8 2
01.07.1999 8 029,0 0,037 578 493,9 0,017 0,0041 0,016 0,025 8 2
01.08.1999 8 322,8 -0,010 588 441,3 -0,012 0,0044 0,098 0,167 9 3
01.09.1999 8 239,7 0,024 581 459,3 0,014 0,0045 0,104 0,121 9 3
01.10.1999 8 436,0 0,115 589 393,1 0,071 0,0046 -0,014 -0,031 9 3
01.11.1999 9 410,3 0,130 631 012,0 0,134 0,0046 -0,054 -0,048 9 3
01.12.1999 10 638,1 0,212 715 521,6 0,222 0,0045 0,308 0,452 9 5
01.01.2000 12 895,0 -0,007 874 605,7 0,000 0,0047 0,489 0,620 9 5
01.02.2000 12 801,9 0,133 874 650,0 0,122 0,0047 0,058 0,061 9 7
01.03.2000 14 509,6 0,000 981 363,6 -0,046 0,0047 0,079 0,093 9 7
01.04.2000 14 510,0 -0,004 936 607,5 0,012 0,0044 -0,016 -0,009 9 7
01.05.2000 14 459,1 -0,051 948 229,0 -0,049 0,0045 0,018 0,044 10 10
01.06.2000 13 724,6 -0,011 901 847,4 0,008 0,0044 0,052 0,038 12 10
01.07.2000 13 577,3 -0,064 909 243,8 -0,048 0,0045 0,161 0,143 12 11
01.08.2000 12 702,4 -0,005 865 733,8 0,031 0,0044 -0,028 -0,046 12 14
01.09.2000 12 636,2 -0,095 892 284,6 -0,109 0,0044 0,059 0,006 12 14
01.10.2000 11 439,0 -0,039 795 425,6 -0,022 0,0044 0,017 0,063 12 14
01.11.2000 10 995,8 -0,045 778 313,0 -0,038 0,0044 0,042 0,045 12 14
01.12.2000 10 499,7 0,048 749 098,0 0,022 0,0043 -0,173 -0,217 12 15
01.01.2001 11 000,9 -0,036 765 689,8 -0,009 0,0041 0,353 0,427 12 15
01.02.2001 10 599,5 -0,195 758 983,1 -0,174 0,0041 0,016 0,003 12 16
01.03.2001 8 537,1 -0,115 627 063,5 -0,118 0,0041 0,091 0,094 12 16
01.04.2001 7 551,6 0,206 553 152,7 0,165 0,0041 -0,062 -0,104 12 16
01.05.2001 9 104,6 -0,076 644 354,5 -0,067 0,0043 -0,022 -0,037 12 16
01.06.2001 8 411,4 -0,080 601 471,7 -0,070 0,0045 0,022 0,055 10 16
01.07.2001 7 742,2 -0,010 559 427,6 0,015 0,0045 0,054 0,066 9 15
01.08.2001 7 661,2 -0,119 567 808,6 -0,108 0,0044 0,033 0,036 8 15
01.09.2001 6 752,3 -0,113 506 394,5 -0,113 0,0043 0,003 0,002 7 15
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01.10.2001 5 987,6 0,147 449 363,2 0,115 0,0043 0,115 0,141 7 15
01.11.2001 6 866,3 0,078 500 933,7 0,069 0,0039 0,071 0,125 7 15
01.12.2001 7 398,8 0,061 535 620,9 0,056 0,0041 -0,027 -0,013 6 15
01.01.2002 7 847,1 -0,073 565 771,3 -0,046 0,0044 0,085 0,100 6 15
01.02.2002 7 271,5 -0,008 539 798,7 0,002 0,0044 0,284 0,431 6 15
01.03.2002 7 214,9 0,039 541 001,0 0,040 0,0044 0,064 0,100 6 15
01.04.2002 7 497,2 -0,105 562 567,4 -0,083 0,0046 0,062 0,104 6 15
01.05.2002 6 708,8 -0,032 515 846,3 -0,016 0,0046 0,030 0,043 5 15
01.06.2002 6 493,7 -0,002 507 794,3 -0,000 0,0046 -0,002 -0,018 5 15
01.07.2002 6 478,9 -0,156 507 755,3 -0,130 0,0045 0,116 0,139 7 15
01.08.2002 5 471,4 0,030 441 494,7 0,018 0,0043 -0,013 -0,003 9 14
01.09.2002 5 637,5 -0,102 449 269,8 -0,107 0,0041 -0,009 -0,021 9 14
01.10.2002 5 060,4 0,133 401 251,7 0,106 0,0040 0,142 0,129 9 14
01.11.2002 5 731,4 0,141 443 759,3 0,124 0,0041 0,271 0,365 9 14
01.12.2002 6 541,4 -0,105 498 699,8 -0,052 0,0041 -0,014 0,000 9 12
01.01.2003 5 852,6 -0,042 472 611,4 -0,033 0,0038 0,245 0,162 9 12
01.02.2003 5 605,9 -0,037 456 796,6 -0,031 0,0037 0,133 0,158 9 10
01.03.2003 5 401,0 0,019 442 757,3 0,000 0,0036 0,181 0,311 9 10
01.04.2003 5 506,0 0,187 442 570,2 0,130 0,0037 1,369 2,077 9 10
01.05.2003 6 534,5 0,057 499 941,4 0,054 0,0037 0,580 0,526 8 7
01.06.2003 6 909,7 -0,037 527 029,0 0,003 0,0034 0,030 0,052 6 7
01.07.2003 6 656,9 0,018 528 359,8 0,006 0,0034 0,438 0,627 6 6
01.08.2003 6 776,6 0,066 531 590,1 0,055 0,0037 -0,000 -0,000 6 3
01.09.2003 7 224,6 0,007 560 722,7 0,027 0,0037 0,726 1,031 6 3
01.10.2003 7 274,1 0,077 575 736,4 0,069 0,0036 0,048 0,091 6 3
01.11.2003 7 836,9 0,041 615 296,9 0,044 0,0039 0,919 1,331 6 3
01.12.2003 8 155,2 0,038 642 596,8 0,058 0,0039 0,047 0,055 5 2
01.01.2004 8 466,6 0,068 679 868,6 0,046 0,0037 1,080 1,538 5 2
01.02.2004 9 038,9 0,071 711 155,9 0,058 0,0037 0,065 0,098 5 3
01.03.2004 9 683,6 -0,015 752 651,5 -0,036 0,0035 0,001 0,015 5 3
01.04.2004 9 533,7 -0,093 725 225,3 -0,076 0,0034 0,078 0,052 5 3
01.05.2004 8 643,6 0,002 670 063,2 0,005 0,0037 -0,002 -0,011 5 4
01.06.2004 8 659,4 0,049 673 361,4 0,039 0,0038 0,008 0,050 5 4
01.07.2004 9 082,6 -0,066 699 352,6 -0,041 0,0037 -0,022 -0,030 5 5
01.08.2004 8 482,1 0,030 670 343,4 0,020 0,0036 0,000 0,016 6 3
01.09.2004 8 734,2 0,097 684 037,0 0,090 0,0035 0,101 0,075 6 3
01.10.2004 9 582,8 0,026 745 357,4 0,029 0,0034 0,025 0,039 6 4
01.11.2004 9 833,2 0,102 766 869,9 0,108 0,0033 -0,030 -0,091 6 4
01.12.2004 10 838,2 0,002 849 502,1 0,012 0,0032 0,086 0,038 6 4
01.01.2005 10 862,7 -0,028 859 622,8 -0,020 0,0031 0,074 0,071 6 4
01.02.2005 10 558,3 0,062 842 381,8 0,067 0,0030 0,003 0,008 7 4
01.03.2005 11 209,0 -0,018 898 972,0 -0,026 0,0032 0,111 0,161 7 4
01.04.2005 11 009,0 -0,018 875 348,3 -0,050 0,0031 0,053 0,050 7 4
01.05.2005 10 807,6 0,036 831 710,9 0,022 0,0028 0,043 0,003 7 4
01.06.2005 11 197,1 0,003 850 291,6 0,013 0,0027 0,063 0,100 8 5
01.07.2005 11 233,2 0,048 861 732,2 0,060 0,0026 -0,010 -0,033 7 5
01.08.2005 11 773,2 0,038 913 058,8 0,047 0,0027 0,042 0,066 6 6
01.09.2005 12 214,9 0,011 955 959,9 0,001 0,0026 0,029 0,052 5 6
01.10.2005 12 352,6 -0,043 957 079,4 -0,045 0,0026 0,016 0,038 5 6
01.11.2005 11 822,2 0,022 913 625,4 0,028 0,0028 1,445 2,122 5 6
01.12.2005 12 087,0 0,054 939 041,3 0,063 0,0028 0,038 0,040 5 8
01.01.2006 12 744,3 0,061 997 750,7 0,077 0,0028 0,153 0,110 6 11
01.02.2006 13 523,0 0,010 1 074 885,7 0,008 0,0029 -0,001 0,001 7 13
01.03.2006 13 658,0 0,100 1 083 520,0 0,087 0,0029 0,033 0,074 7 13
01.04.2006 15 019,9 0,051 1 178 218,3 0,037 0,0031 0,044 0,036 8 13
01.05.2006 15 782,4 -0,051 1 222 182,5 -0,053 0,0033 0,310 0,470 10 13
01.06.2006 14 973,6 -0,017 1 156 974,0 -0,025 0,0033 0,020 0,060 10 13
01.07.2006 14 725,4 -0,022 1 127 626,3 -0,013 0,0034 0,020 0,086 10 13
01.08.2006 14 401,8 0,043 1 113 361,7 0,025 0,0033 0,194 0,311 10 14
01.09.2006 15 020,6 0,007 1 141 744,5 0,002 0,0031 0,074 0,018 10 16
01.10.2006 15 131,6 0,065 1 144 535,7 0,070 0,0031 -0,050 0,081 10 16
01.11.2006 16 121,3 0,042 1 224 450,3 0,058 0,0031 0,056 0,066 10 16




01.12.2006 16 799,3 0,061 1 295 199,7 0,058 0,0030 -0,004 0,030 11 17
01.01.2007 17 816,1 0,034 1 370 018,5 0,036 0,0032 0,116 0,063 13 18
01.02.2007 18 416,1 -0,035 1 419 023,0 -0,038 0,0034 0,063 0,001 12 18
01.03.2007 17 765,5 0,078 1 365 480,9 0,067 0,0033 0,224 -0,210 12 18
01.04.2007 19 146,9 0,086 1 456 980,0 0,067 0,0034 1,385 2,113 12 18
01.05.2007 20 796,8 0,029 1 554 360,1 0,014 0,0035 -0,031 -0,013 12 19
01.06.2007 21 400,3 0,007 1 576 679,2 0,014 0,0037 0,064 0,105 12 20
01.07.2007 21 559,1 -0,029 1 599 243,6 -0,024 0,0038 0,164 0,198 15 20
01.08.2007 20 932,3 0,014 1 561 259,4 -0,006 0,0037 -0,034 0,044 15 25
01.09.2007 21 225,4 0,095 1 552 457,6 0,081 0,0036 -0,004 0,066 15 25
01.10.2007 23 251,1 -0,009 1 678 068,8 -0,004 0,0037 0,004 0,010 15 26
01.11.2007 23 038,9 -0,039 1 671 080,7 -0,044 0,0036 -0,014 0,026 15 25
01.12.2007 22 137,5 -0,016 1 598 031,4 -0,015 0,0035 -0,034 0,038 16 26
01.01.2008 21 774,9 -0,095 1 574 824,3 -0,094 0,0036 0,196 0,144 18 26
01.02.2008 19 714,7 0,027 1 426 778,3 0,036 0,0033 0,040 0,033 17 26
01.03.2008 20 253,6 0,027 1 477 532,4 0,017 0,0033 -0,025 0,007 17 26
01.04.2008 20 807,7 0,010 1 502 712,7 0,001 0,0034 0,073 0,005 17 26
01.05.2008 21 019,7 0,031 1 504 304,3 0,023 0,0035 -0,059 -0,010 15 26
01.06.2008 21 669,3 -0,119 1 538 778,9 -0,108 0,0037 0,248 0,278 15 25
01.07.2008 19 083,8 -0,027 1 373 081,8 -0,044 0,0039 0,076 0,079 15 25
01.08.2008 18 561,4 -0,039 1 312 712,2 -0,043 0,0037 -0,005 0,045 14 23
01.09.2008 17 830,3 -0,219 1 256 628,4 -0,228 0,0035 0,222 0,247 14 24
01.10.2008 13 930,6 -0,217 970 114,1 -0,226 0,0034 0,026 -0,055 14 24
01.11.2008 10 908,7 -0,174 750 835,7 -0,184 0,0033 0,132 0,058 14 24
01.12.2008 9 006,9 0,136 613 014,3 0,117 0,0028 -0,166 0,098 13 22
01.01.2009 10 231,5 -0,122 684 728,2 -0,101 0,0026 0,276 0,059 12 19
01.02.2009 8 979,7 -0,115 615 842,7 -0,101 0,0028 0,040 0,011 11 16
01.03.2009 7 948,5 0,187 553 810,7 0,166 0,0028 0,121 0,318 11 17
01.04.2009 9 437,2 0,199 645 947,5 0,171 0,0028 0,085 0,374 10 17
01.05.2009 11 317,5 0,148 756 128,0 0,149 0,0029 0,110 0,129 9 17
01.06.2009 12 998,0 -0,025 868 715,6 -0,023 0,0033 1,165 1,706 9 17
01.07.2009 12 672,4 0,114 848 484,7 0,118 0,0031 0,092 0,256 9 16
01.08.2009 14 115,6 -0,002 948 743,4 0,004 0,0030 0,090 0,224 7 15
01.09.2009 14 092,7 0,030 952 563,9 0,040 0,0030 0,053 0,063 7 14
01.10.2009 14 517,9 0,027 990 999,4 0,034 0,0029 0,016 0,022 7 14
01.11.2009 14 912,8 0,050 1 025 121,6 0,060 0,0029 0,052 0,181 7 14
01.12.2009 15 658,9 -0,029 1 086 862,4 -0,020 0,0028 -0,009 0,030 6 13
01.01.2010 15 197,2 0,001 1 065 224,0 0,001 0,0030 0,093 0,076 5 12
01.02.2010 15 206,5 -0,011 1 065 918,4 -0,014 0,0029 0,044 -0,074 4 11
01.03.2010 15 042,0 0,094 1 050 663,0 0,075 0,0027 0,218 0,387 4 11
01.04.2010 16 452,5 0,003 1 129 591,3 -0,001 0,0028 0,167 0,242 4 11
01.05.2010 16 494,2 -0,127 1 127 981,7 -0,144 0,0027 0,150 0,184 4 9
01.06.2010 14 396,6 -0,021 965 014,5 -0,029 0,0023 0,118 0,131 4 9
01.07.2010 14 093,5 0,190 937 404,0 0,195 0,0023 0,071 0,318 3 8
01.08.2010 16 767,6 -0,047 1 119 890,8 -0,056 0,0024 -0,016 0,029 3 3
01.09.2010 15 973,3 0,114 1 057 656,7 0,118 0,0021 0,069 0,073 3 3
01.10.2010 17 793,3 0,025 1 182 269,9 0,030 0,0022 0,023 0,188 3 1
01.11.2010 18 230,2 -0,029 1 217 755,8 -0,024 0,0023 0,004 -0,037 3 1
01.12.2010 17 695,5 0,101 1 188 496,4 0,112 0,0025 0,170 0,420 2
01.01.2011 19 490,6 0,025 1 321 050,0 0,037 0,0027 0,166 0,056
01.02.2011 19 974,4 -0,012 1 370 129,8 -0,006 0,0028 0,034 0,104
01.03.2011 19 739,2 0,035 1 362 073,3 0,030 0,0029 0,004 -0,057 
01.04.2011 20 420,3 0,078 1 403 009,4 0,059 0,0029 0,122 0,190
01.05.2011 22 016,8 -0,051 1 485 415,0 -0,066 0,0028 0,103 0,045
01.06.2011 20 901,2 -0,044 1 386 807,5 -0,048 0,0026 0,087 -0,101 
01.07.2011 19 980,2 -0,084 1 320 923,1 -0,080 0,0026 0,082 0,006
01.08.2011 18 310,5 -0,072 1 214 630,4 -0,077 0,0022 0,226 0,149
01.09.2011 16 999,4 -0,143 1 120 600,2 0,0020
01.10.2011 14 573,2 0,091 0,0017
01.11.2011 15 894,1 0,010 0,0017
01.12.2011 16 060,2 0,004 0,0018
01.01.2012 16 127,2 0,0017
  XXVIII 






Buyout CAPM EW MSCI Buyout CAPM VW MSCI
Number of obs 145 145 Number of obs
F(  1,   143) 206,15 F(  1,   143) 84,69
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,6027 R-squared 0,5833
Root MSE 0,0675 Root MSE 0,0852
Robust Robust
borfew Coef. Std.Err. t P>t borfvw Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
rmrfmsci 1,005564 0,0700359 14,36 0 0,867125 1,144004 rmrfmsci 1,219387 0,1324992 9,2 0 0,957 1,481297
_cons -0,0053352 0,0055658 -0,96 0,339 -0,01634 0,0056667 _cons -0,0086228 0,0066672 -1,29 0,198 -0,02 0,004556
VC CAPM EW MSCI VC CAPM VW MSCI
Number of obs 145 Number of obs 145
F(  1,   143) 65,79 F(  1,   143) 97,66
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,2597 R-squared 0,3858
Root MSE 0,1245 Root MSE 0,1187
Robust
vcrfew Coef. Std.Err. t P>t borfvw Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
rmrfmsci 0,8920296 0,1099752 8,11 0 0,674642 1,109417 rmrfmsci 1,137815 0,1151338 9,88 0 0,91 1,365399
_cons 0,0071973 0,010394 0,69 0,49 -0,01335 0,027743 _cons 0,0009431 0,0099661 0,09 0,925 -0,02 0,020643
Buyout in excess of VC CAPM EW MSCI Buyout in excess of VC VW MSCI
Number of obs 145 Number of obs 145
F(  1,   143) 0,66 F(  1,   143) 0,3
Prob > F 0,4169 Prob > F 0,5829
R-squared 0,0024 R-squared 0,0025
Root MSE 0,1495 Root MSE 0,1283
Robust Robust
bovcew Coef. Std.Err. t P>t bovcvw Coef. Std. Err. t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
rmrfmsci 0,0878123 0,1078491 0,81 0,417 -0,12537 0,3009968 rmrfmsci 0,0774954 0,1408112 0,55 0,583 -0,2 0,355836
_cons -0,012817 0,0124043 -1,03 0,303 -0,03734 0,0117026 _cons -0,0131869 0,0105439 -1,25 0,213 -0,03 0,007655
[95% Conf. Interval]
[95% Conf. Interval]
MSCI Nordic Index: Single Factor Regression - CAPM
[95% Conf. Interval]
Buyout CAPM EW Nordic CAPM EW NI Buyout CAPM VW Nordic CAPM VW NI BO
Linear regression Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  1,   143) 191,49 F(  1,   143) 90,22
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,3864 R-squared 0,6197
Root MSE 0,10608 Root MSE 0,08209
Robust Robust
niewbo       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwbo       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf    1.075798   .0777428    13.84 0 0,9221247 1,229472 nirmrf    1.338944   .1409657     9.50 0 1,060298 1,61759
_cons    .0039705   .0088217     0.45 0,653 -0,0134673 0,021408 _cons    -.006796   .0064259    -1.06 0,292 -0,019498 0,0059059
VC CAPM EW Nordic CAPM EW NI VC VC CAPM VW Nordic CAPM VW NI VC
Linear regression Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  1,   143) 86,79 F(  1,   143) 113,19
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,2941 R-squared 0,4178
Root MSE 0,12467 Root MSE 0,11618
Robust Robust
niewvc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwvc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf    1.028257   .1103711     9.32 0 0,8100879 1,246427 nirmrf    1.257646   .1182089    10.64 0 1,023983 1,491308
_cons    .0163865   .0103219     1.59 0,115 -0,0040167 0,03679 _cons    .0062725   .0096752     0.65 0,518 -0,0128523 0,0253973
Buyout in excess of VC CAPM EW Nordic CAPM EW BO-VC NI Buyout in excess of VC CAPM VW Nordic CAPM VW NI BO-VC
Linear regression Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  1,   143) 0,18 F(  1,   143) 0,3
Prob > F 0,673 Prob > F 0,5835
R-squared 0,0006 R-squared 0,0025
Root MSE 0,14956 Root MSE 0,12832
Robust Robust
niewbovc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwbovc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf    .0474385   .1121732     0.42 0,673 -0,1742935 0,26917 nirmrf     .081405   .1481456     0.55 0,584 -0,2114333 0,3742433
_cons   -.0124912   .0124285    -1.01 0,317 -0,0370586 0,012076 _cons    -.013145   .0105416    -1.25 0,214 -0,0339826 0,0076925
Ad-Hoc Nordic Index: Single Factor Regression - CAPM












BO Fama French EW Nordic FAMA EW BO NI BO Fama French VW Nordic FAMA VW NI BO
Linear regression Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  3,   141) 64,54 F(  3,   141) 33,9
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,3875 R-squared 0,6231
Root MSE 0,10674 Root MSE 0,0823
Robust Robust
niewbo       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwbo       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf    1.087429   .0859609    12.65 0 0,9174905 1,257368 nirmrf    1.358986   .1510885     8.99 0 1,060294 1,657678
smb     .047616   .1275552     0.37 0,709 -0,2045519 0,299784 smb    .0980559   .1190815     0.82 0,412 -0,13736 0,3334719
hml   -.0317879   .0850463    -0.37 0,709 -0,1999187 0,136343 hml   -.0653042   .0793879    -0.82 0,412 -0,2222486 0,0916401
_cons    .0030446   .0098157     0.31 0,757 -0,0163604 0,02245 _cons   -.0072899   .0063287    -1.15 0,251 -0,0198014 0,0052216
VC Fama French EW Nordic VC Fama French VW Nordic FAMA VW NI VC
Linear regression
Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  3,   141) 38,05 F(  3,   141) 39,94
Prob > F 0 Prob > F 0
R-squared 0,3505 R-squared 0,4303
Root MSE 0,12042 Root MSE 0,11574
Robust Robust
niewvc           Coef.                 Std. Err.                t                              P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwvc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf              1.162358             .1120922          10.37 0 0,9407594 1,383956 nirmrf    1.319062   .1218314    10.83 0 1,07821 1,559915
smb                .5985005          .2068106            2.89 0,004 0,1896502 1,007351 smb    .2670066   .1523296     1.75 0,082 -0,0341387 0,5681519
hml               -.3990674          .1378704         -2.89 0,004 -0,6716277 -0,12651 hml   -.1780981    .101552    -1.75 0,082 -0,3788595 0,0226632
_cons           .0091181            .0092465           0.99 0,326 -0,0091615 0,027398 _cons     .002455   .0094705     0.26 0,796 -0,0162675 0,0211775
Buyout in excess of VC Fama French EW Nordic Fama EW NI BO-VC Buyout in excess of VC Fama French VW Nordic FAMA VW NI BO-VC
Linear regression Number of obs 145 Linear regression Number of obs 145
F(  3,   141) 2,09 F(  3,   141) 1,13
Prob > F 0,1043 Prob > F 0,3409
R-squared 0,0469 R-squared 0,0172
Root MSE 0,14709 Root MSE 0,12827
Robust Robust
niewbovc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval] nivwbovc       Coef.   Std. Err.      t P>t [95% Conf. Interval]
nirmrf   -.0749982   .1201858    -0.62 0,534 -0,3125972 0,162601 nirmrf    .0401067   .1557857     0.26 0,797 -0,2678709 0,3480843
smb   -.5507492   .2274313    -2.42 0,017 -1,000365 -0,10113 smb   -.1686193   .1756216    -0.96 0,339 -0,5158112 0,1785725
hml    .3671891   .1516231     2.42 0,017 0,0674406 0,666938 hml    .1125729   .1170821     0.96 0,338 -0,1188903 0,3440361
_cons   -.0061514   .0123157    -0.50 0,618 -0,0304986 0,018196 _cons   -.0098262   .0105651    -0.93 0,354 -0,0307127 0,0110604
Ad-Hoc Nordic Index: Three Factor Regression - Fama-French 2012
